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Nietzsche’s accounts of selfhood and freedom appear to contain inconsistencies. At 
a theoretical level, Nietzsche suggests that our common conceptions of selfhood and 
freedom are poisonous illusions. However, his practical philosophy utilises both 
concepts. This thesis explores and resolves these inconsistencies. It is argued that 
Nietzsche’s practical philosophy does not require the concepts that he theoretically 
rejects. Without presupposing consistency, it is shown that an attempt to resolve the 
inconsistencies should be undertaken. Nietzsche was not deliberately inconsistent in 
these areas. To set the scene for a positive account of Nietzschean selfhood, an 
analysis of Nietzsche’s drive psychology and treatment of conscious deliberation is 
undertaken. The Nietzschean self should be understood as a complex structure of 
interacting drives and affects. This account of selfhood maintains Nietzsche’s 
rejection of metaphysical and transcendental conceptions of self whilst avoiding 
excessive reductionism. It is argued that by redefining selfhood, Nietzsche can 
coherently endorse a drive-based fatalism and the ideal of self-creation. Importantly, 
it is shown how self-creation can be a self-consciously subjective act. One achieves 
subjectivity when one comes to view oneself as a Nietzschean self. Nietzsche finds 
freedom within his fatalistic framework in two ways. Firstly, Nietzschean autonomy 
is achieved when one follows values legislated by one’s own will to power. Secondly, 
ultimate freedom is constituted by a freedom from nihilism. One achieves such 
freedom when one can affirm the doctrine of eternal recurrence. It is also argued that 
Nietzsche’s general philosophical project can be reconciled with his fatalism. Far 
from a contradiction, Nietzsche’s practical philosophy is a total reckoning with and 
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Nietzsche’s Free Self 
 
“Where can one think of fleeing, if the cell is everything?” 
-Bernardo Soares1 
 
1 - Introduction 
Nietzsche’s accounts of freedom and selfhood appear to contain inconsistencies. 
They arise when one attempts to combine his theoretical and practical philosophy. At 
a theoretical level, Nietzsche suggests that our common conceptions of agential 
freedom and selfhood are poisonous illusions. However, his practical philosophy 
seems to utilise both concepts. My solution to this problem is that we must interpret 
Nietzsche’s practical philosophy in a way that does not require the notions of selfhood 
and freedom that he theoretically eliminates. I suggest that Nietzsche reintroduces 
selfhood and freedom into his practical philosophy on his own radical terms. 
I begin by presenting my methodology and elucidating the inconsistencies under 
analysis. I then explore two recent arguments that claim these inconsistencies cannot 
and should not be overcome. Concluding that these arguments are unsuccessful, I 
develop a resolution. This proceeds with an exploration of Nietzsche’s drive 
psychology and account of consciousness. I then explore the idea that a Nietzschean 
self is a “social structure of the drives” (BGE: 12). Anderson (2012) has offered a 
nuanced, but problematic account of this reading. Working from Anderson, I develop 
my own account of Nietzschean selfhood. I then argue that Nietzschean selves can be 
free in two ways. Firstly, we are ‘autonomous’ when we follow values that benefit 
our power. Secondly, Nietzsche’s ideal freedom amounts to a ‘freedom from 
nihilism’. These notions of freedom do not require the kind of free will that Nietzsche 
attacks. I will therefore conclude that Nietzsche’s theoretical and practical accounts 
of selfhood and freedom are not inconsistent because his practical understanding of 
such notions does not require the concepts that he theoretically rejects. To the 
contrary, it is developed from and overcomes the theoretical rejection of such 
concepts. 
                                                 
1 The Book of Disquiet, F. Pessoa. Section 43. 
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2 - Nietzschean Inconsistency 
 
2.1 Methodology 
Here I will mark the boundaries of my exploration, rather than enter the debate over 
how best to conduct Nietzsche scholarship. Firstly, I am not concerned with 
examining what Nietzsche could, would or should have written. I am concerned with 
the philosophical content of his work, primarily the work published during his life. 
This involves interpreting certain passages in terms of other passages, rather than in 
terms of what Nietzsche may or should have believed. Of course this involves 
choosing the guiding passages for one’s interpretation. In Beyond Good and Evil 
(BGE) 12, Nietzsche claims that those who reject traditional conceptions of selfhood 
are “condemned…to inventing the new - and, who knows? perhaps to finding it”. This 
passage is not only my guiding light in terms of Nietzschean selfhood, but 
characterises my general approach to Nietzsche’s work. I read him as radically 
reconceiving of selfhood, freedom, and, despite my focus, much else. 
Secondly, my aim is to elucidate Nietzsche’s philosophy rather than to make it 
acceptable to contemporary readers. I will not argue that one should accept the 
philosophy below as ‘the truth’, but that one should accept it as Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. 
Finally, that Nietzsche’s work contains at least superficial inconsistencies is well 
documented. A more contested matter is whether or not Nietzsche aimed at a 
philosophical ‘system’. Furthermore, if there is a system, it may not be present on the 
surface. If one does not accept that Nietzsche was accidentally inconsistent, there are 
two ways one can approach an inconsistency. One can claim that it is a consequence 
of a deliberately unsystematic philosophy. Alternatively, a resolution can be 
attempted. This can be approached in a number of intricate ways. One could either 
develop a consistent Nietzschean system or argue that there is consistency within 
Nietzsche’s writing. If the latter, one could attempt to find Nietzsche’s system. 
Alternatively, one can maintain that Nietzsche was unsystematic, but argue that the 
examined inconsistency does not contain any contradictions of thought. A different 
‘resolution’ approach is to claim that the inconsistency is deliberate or the result of 
our misunderstanding the role of certain passages. 
My approach to Nietzschean Inconsistency starts from the position that there is 
nothing inherently wrong with looking for consistency whilst remaining agnostic 
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about how systematic Nietzsche aimed to be on any level. A search for consistency 
need not presuppose that it exists or that, if it does not, the inconsistency is 
problematic. If lack of contradictory thought in my chosen area can be found, I do not 
pretend that this supports the idea of a systematic Nietzsche or vice versa. 
 
2.2 Theoretical and Practical Inconsistencies 
I understand the theoretical-practical distinction as follows. Nietzsche’s practical 
philosophy is his putatively normative philosophy. The theoretical designates 
Nietzsche’s descriptive exploration of human existence. 
Nietzsche’s theoretical elimination of the self focuses on the notion of an ‘I’ or 
soul that is simple, identical and has causal powers. 
 
“That belief which regards the soul as…indestructible, eternal, 
indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be ejected from 
science!” (BGE: 12) 
 
“When I analyse the event expressed in the sentence ‘I think’, I acquire a 
series of rash assertions which are difficult, perhaps impossible to prove 
- for example, that it is I who think, that is has to be something at all which 
thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity 
thought of as a cause, that an ‘I’ exists.” (BGE: 16) 
 
“There is no ‘being’ behind doing, acting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely 
a fiction imposed on the doing - the doing itself is everything.” (GM I: 
13) 
 
The first quote points to a rejection of any sort of Platonic or Christian soul. The target 
here is a simple, identical and eternal entity. The second appears to target Kant. By 
analysing the ‘I’ of ‘I think’ Kant finds a transcendental self existing as a logical 
function necessary for thought. We know of its existence a priori and, whilst it is non-
substantial, it is necessarily simple and identical. Thought, for Kant, is an activity of 
this ‘I’ (C: B133, B407-408). In the third quote, Nietzsche rejects the self considered 
as separate from action. This is the idea that the self exists prior to its ‘doings’ and at 
least can be the cause of and locus of responsibility for those ‘doings’. 
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Nietzsche also appears to hold a deterministic world view incompatible with free 
will. 
 
“If one were all-knowing, one would be able to calculate every individual 
action…The actor himself…is fixed in the illusion of the free will.” (HH: 
106) 
 
One of Nietzsche’s aims was to explore how we might overcome nihilism. 
Nietzschean nihilism is a will to nothingness (GM: II-24. May, 2009: p.89). This will 
is “an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental pre-conditions of life” 
(GM: III-28). We will see later that nihilism manifests itself differently throughout 
history and the term, for Nietzsche, is incredibly broad in scope. There can even be a 
tension between different forms of nihilism. The ascetic ideal overcomes suicidal 
nihilism by giving suffering a meaning (GM: III-28), but both approaches to the world 
are manifestations of the will to nothingness. Nothingness, for Nietzsche, is that 
which is not part of reality (May, 2009: p.100). The ascetic ideal posits absolute 
values, afterlives, gods, and hates life as it really is. It wills nothingness. The suicidal 
nihilist holds that there are no absolute values and life is without meaning. Nietzsche 
agrees that absolute values do not exist. However, the suicidal nihilist is mistaken in 
thinking that life is thereby void of any value or meaning. Both positions are 
rebellions against life, but the mode of rebellion is different, as are the consequences. 
Nietzsche pushes nihilism to its limits by undermining everything that has hitherto 
provided us with meaning. Nihilism becomes a practical crisis. We will come to see 
ourselves as the impotent, godless and meaningless “plaything[s] of absurdity” (GM: III-
28). However, Nietzsche aims to show us the way beyond this crisis towards an 
affirmation of life and overcoming of the will to nothingness. Selfhood plays a key role 
here. Nietzsche thought that free individuals would create their own values and 
meaning for life. We are urged to become who we are, to affirm our individual natures 
(GS: 270, 335. TSZ: Honey Offering). Individuals capable of escaping nihilism are 
capable of self-creation. Most scholars acknowledge that Nietzsche does not 
completely theoretically reject the notion of selfhood. Rather, he rejects certain 
common conceptions of selfhood. We must then find his positive account of selfhood. 
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Further tensions arise through Nietzsche’s rejection of free will. If we have no free 
will it seems as though it will be difficult to self-create. Leiter (2001) has referred to 
this as “The paradox of fatalism and self-creation”.  
 
1) Fatalism: “A person’s life proceeds along a fixed trajectory, fixed by 
‘natural’ facts about that person.” (Leiter, 2001: p.287) 
2) Self-Creation: “The trajectory of a person’s life is something that that 
person creates.” (Leiter, 2001: p.289) 
 
Nietzsche appears to theoretically endorse some kind of fatalism whilst practically 
suggesting that free individuals can create their own “trajectory”. Leiter suggests that 
for a person to create themselves they must satisfy two conditions. 
 
a) “The person must be the necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, 
cause of what he becomes (‘Causal Condition’) [(CC)]. 
b) The person, in fulfilling the Causal Condition, must satisfy the 
requirements for autonomous or free action (‘Autonomy Condition’) 
[(AC)].” (Leiter, 2001: p.289) 
 
Leiter distinguishes between classical determinism, classical fatalism and causal 
essentialism. He suggests that Nietzsche was a causal essentialist. This is the view 
“that there are essential natural facts about persons that significantly circumscribe the 
range of life trajectories that person can realize” (Leiter, 2001: p.289). These facts 
interact with one’s “environment and circumstances” such that external factors will 
also play a role in determining one’s trajectory (Leiter, 2001: p.299). Nietzsche refers 
to these facts as ‘drives’. It is a matter of significant debate as to whether or not drives 
are ‘natural’ or have a biological basis. This matter is beyond the scope of my work 
here. Remaining agnostic about the extent of Nietzsche’s naturalism, the idea is that 
drives solely determine who we are. Nietzsche’s causal essentialism (henceforth: 
fatalism) appears to preclude the possibility of AC. Leiter suggests that if we are to 
meet AC then we must have free will, but that Nietzsche rejects compatibilism. Given 
the truth of fatalism, Nietzsche rejects free will. Nietzsche rejects the concept of a 
causa sui. “The desire for ‘freedom of will’ in that metaphysical superlative sense…is 
nothing less than the desire to be precisely that causa sui” (BGE: 21). However, we 
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are no such thing as there is no such thing as a causa sui (BGE: 21). “Our ‘will’ is an 
artefact of the facts about us, and thus can not be the source of genuinely autonomous 
action” (Leiter, 2001: p.292). 
Nietzsche’s rejection of the complete freedom of the will, as causa sui, need not 
commit him to a rejection of free will outright. One may be strongly pushed in certain 
directions, but have some autonomous control over what one does. Alternatively, one 
may be free to identify or align oneself with the facts that determine one’s action. 
Leiter argues that Nietzsche does reject free will outright. Take another statement of 
the paradox. 
 
“If a person’s life trajectories are determined…by the natural facts about 
himself, then how can a person really create himself, i.e. how can he make 
an autonomous causal contribution to the course of that life?” (Leiter, 
2001: p.289) 
 
Understanding Nietzsche in this way either assumes or implies a certain view of 
personhood or selfhood. The picture is that a person is made up of subpersonal ‘facts’ 
that are about that person and something else that is that person2. The ‘something 
else’ (X) appears to be ‘the person’ or accounts for the existence of personhood. If 
the X is not solely constitutive of personhood, it is posited as the seat of autonomous 
control over oneself. The possibility of autonomous control is projected onto the X. 
If subpersonal facts determine our every action at every level then we have no 
autonomous control. Leiter reads Nietzsche as claiming that this is the case. He 
understands Nietzsche as claiming that conscious deliberation is epiphenomenal and 
that the X, whatever it is, has no control. The X is seen as some kind of “conscious 
self” which is causally inert (Leiter, 2001: p.318). We can therefore refine Leiter’s 
incompatibilist reading somewhat. Nietzsche was an incompatibilist fatalist in terms 
of free will understood as the autonomous (to any degree) control of an X over action 
or subpersonal facts (X-incompatibilism). Leiter does not provide such a refinement 
                                                 
2 Throughout this work the personal/subpersonal distinction is not used as a Dennettian distinction 
between different kinds of explanation for behaviour (Hornsby, 2000: p.6-8). Following the literature 
on Nietzsche, the distinction is between aspects of an individual that constitute selfhood/personhood 




himself because for him X-incompatibilism just is outright incompatibilism. No 
understanding of free will is compatible with the truth of fatalism because any such 
understanding must attribute free will to an X, but fatalism precludes such attribution. 
There are two points to make here. 
Although an inconsistency exists on a certain reading of Nietzsche, I have yet to 
argue for such a fatalist reading. I will motivate this reading when I put forward my 
account of Nietzschean selfhood. 
Secondly, I will defend a compatibilist reading of Nietzsche if compatibilism is 
understood vaguely as the idea that some notion of freedom is compatible with 
fatalism. I will argue that Nietzsche redefines what it means to be free and thus moves 
beyond outright incompatibilism. 
Before resolving the above inconsistencies we must tackle arguments put forward 
by Gardner (2009) and Stern (2015) that suggest attempts at resolution are futile. 
 
3 - Deliberate Inconsistencies 
 
3.1 A Sign of the Times 
Gardner focuses on the problem of valuing when highlighting Nietzsche’s 
inconsistency. There are two important features of Nietzschean valuing. Firstly, the 
ideal individual must see themselves as the “ground of the value that he affirms” 
(Gardner, 2009: p.8). ‘Ground’ here is meant to capture the idea that an individual 
must legislate their own values. Acts of legislation constitute an agent’s values. The 
second feature of valuing is that our values reflect and constitute who we are. We 
affirm ourselves when we affirm our values. “To determine such and such to be of 
value is to determine oneself, and to affirm oneself by way of affirming what one 
values” (Gardner, 2009: p.8-9). The language here highlights the problem. Valuing is 
bound to the concept of a self that is active in the creation of value. 
Gardner suggests that a real ‘I’ is necessary to comprehend this valuing. 
Nietzschean valuing goes beyond simple valuation of oneself. It is not just that what 
is of value is oneself, but that one is of value when one creates one’s values. Thus, 
although what we value is partly constitutive of who we are, there must be something 
that creates and legislates value in the first place. For Gardner, this is the ‘I’. It is the 
“formal [condition] for valuing” (2009: p.8). It is not that the ‘I’ is valued, it is that 
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the ‘I’ is necessary for valuing. Gardner claims that if we cannot conceive of ourselves 
as valuing in this way then self-alienation looms large. 
 
“While it is true that there is no inconsistency between our thinking of 
some individual as bearing value on account of their psychological 
structure, if that individual is to think of himself as bearing value, then the 
I‐conception is indispensable: Nietzschean man must set value on himself, 
not on some psychological structure.” (Gardner, 2009: p.9) 
 
The view seems to be the following. An individual is valuable when or because they 
create their own values. Thus, one can only view oneself as valuable if one views 
oneself as creating one’s values. In order to view oneself as such, “the I-conception 
is indispensable”. Value must be seen as issuing from oneself and not just a 
psychological structure. Self-alienation is a problem here because, as with Leiter, the 
psychological structure of an individual is conceived of as distinct from the self. 
Psychological structures are not selves, but pertain to selves. Although we can see 
how the values of others issue from their psychological structure, if we view ourselves 
in this way we become self-alienated. We cannot view ourselves as the creators of 
our values. Gardner also suggests that if we conceive of our values as just the 
expression of our psychological structures then we cannot justify these values. They 
can only be justified as our values if they result from our creative act of valuing 
(Gardner, 2009: p.16). The ultimate claim Gardner makes is that even if our values 
are wholly determined by our psychological structures, we cannot value ourselves if 
we self-consciously view our acts of valuing in this way. We must view ourselves as 
the determiners of value and this necessarily involves an “I-conception” (Gardner, 
2009: p.9). Nietzsche’s theoretical rejection of the self and ‘I’ therefore appears to 
contradict his practical account of valuing. 
Gardner next explores the theoretical account of selfhood that Nietzsche requires 
to avoid this contradiction. Nietzsche need not reject some kind of transcendental self. 
Kant argued that a transcendental self is necessary for the subjective unification of 
representations (C: B132). Through his analysis of the ‘I’ he concluded that this self 
was simple and identical. However, it exists transcendentally as a necessary logical 
function for thought. We cannot move from an a priori analysis of the ‘I’ to the 
conclusion that we are necessarily constituted by a substantial self that is simple, 
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identical and eternal. Kant provides a notion of selfhood placed between Platonic 
understandings of the self as soul and Humean-style rejection of selfhood. Gardner 
suggests that Nietzsche requires a similar notion of selfhood and that he could have 
coherently rejected Kant’s further thinking whilst retaining a transcendental self. 
However, Nietzsche does in fact reject transcendental selfhood (Gardner, 2009: p.12). 
Nietzsche also requires a notion of selfhood that simultaneously captures two 
ideas. Firstly, the self and its values are determined by an underlying psychological 
structure. Secondly, the self cannot be reduced to this structure or parts of it and its 
role is to unify the psychological manifold. The self and its values are the expression 
of a psychological structure, but we are conscious of such expression as belonging to 
and coming from ourselves. Again, Nietzsche does not offer a theoretical conception 
of selfhood that captures this thinking (Gardner, 2009: p.12-15). 
The vehemence of Nietzsche’s theoretical rejection of selfhood leads Gardner to 
posit the impossibility of reconciling his theoretical and practical philosophy. 
Through a meta-philosophical analysis, Gardner claims that this inconsistency was 
deliberate. Nietzsche can be read “as diagnosing the disunity in philosophical reason, 
identifying it as marking our philosophical horizon, and displaying it for the benefit 
of our self-understanding” (Gardner, 2009: p.22). There are two arguments for this 
claim. The negative argument follows Gardner’s attempts to unify Nietzsche’s 
reasoning. Concluding that this is impossible, a reason for the inconsistency is put 
forward. The positive argument moves beyond selfhood. Gardner’s theory is that 
Nietzsche’s whole philosophy aimed to display the disunity of philosophical reason. 
This is apparently most evident in On the Genealogy of Morals (GM) III-28. Gardner 
claims that this section abandons the largely naturalistic analysis of morality provided 
throughout GM. Here Nietzsche does not examine humanity’s search for meaning in 
a genealogical, historical or psychological context. He does not attempt to provide an 
origin of this need. Our search for meaning appears to be an essential practical 
problem for humanity throughout time. Gardner’s “contention is therefore that 
Nietzsche concludes the Genealogy with the affirmation that we have a need which 
points beyond nature and which renders a non-naturalistic self-conception 
inescapable” (Gardner, 2009: p.26). He further suggests that Nietzsche could not 
naturalise our search for meaning. If it was reduced to just another drive or 
consequence of our nature then Nietzsche would have to hold “that the need for 
[meaning] cannot be taken with philosophical seriousness”, but Nietzsche clearly 
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treats this need seriously3 (Gardner, 2009: p.28). Gardner still resists a transcendental 
or non-naturalistic reading of Nietzsche. He notes that Nietzsche held that there was 
nothing that makes a non-naturalistic self-conception correct or our need for 
something beyond nature rational or justified. Rather, this need is just a brute fact 
about humanity. This generates the inconsistency. Theoretically, we cannot justify a 
non-natural notion of selfhood or need for meaning. Practically, we cannot avoid such 
notions. Gardner claims that Nietzsche viewed this as the point at which philosophical 
reflection halts, we cannot overcome this disunity of reason. So Nietzsche’s 
theoretical-practical inconsistency is both real and deliberate. It highlights the point 
at which the modern philosophical mind has arrived and will not move beyond 
(Gardner, 2009: p.26-29). 
 
3.2 A Philosophy of the Future 
There are three problems with Gardner’s theory. Firstly, it is a strange claim to make 
that if our search for meaning can be naturalised or explained in terms of drives it 
would lack philosophical seriousness. Naturalising a phenomenon does not entail that 
it becomes uninteresting. As Gardner notes, most of GM provides a complex 
naturalistic explanation of our moral systems so as to reveal their lack of metaphysical 
warrant. This does not reduce Nietzsche’s interest in these systems. Gardner’s worry 
is perhaps that our search for meaning cannot be explained away. There is no 
theoretical philosophy that will make us give up the search. Again, it is unclear as to 
why naturalising this search would reduce its force. Explaining a desire in social, 
historical or psychological terms does not entail that the desire ceases to operate, or 
that it should do. Lastly, Nietzsche acknowledges that even if our erroneous views 
about morality are exposed, we are creatures of habit. Our common conceptions of 
such phenomenon are so ingrained that we do not simply relinquish them after reading 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche may agree that the I-conception is ineliminable. His insight is 
to explain why it comes to exist and becomes ineliminable within a certain conceptual 
and moral system. This system is a contingent fabrication and is eliminable. This 
leads to the second objection. 
                                                 
3 Nietzsche rejects the ascetic ideal as a solution to the problem of meaning, but also aims to provide 
us with a new solution (GM: II-24, III-28). 
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To a certain extent Nietzsche wanted to highlight the disunity of reason within 
modern philosophy. However, this comes at an earlier stage to his practical 
philosophy. The disunity of the modern mind is due to the death of God and other 
metaphysical realities. Here we find an instance of GM III-28’s suicidal nihilism. We 
hold onto our search for metaphysical meaning, but find no metaphysical realities 
(May, 2009: p.100-103). Life becomes meaningless. Nietzsche’s practical philosophy 
is supposed to overcome this nihilism. We will later see that this overcoming requires 
that we abandon our search for anything beyond reality. Nietzsche’s practical 
philosophy may not be the best way of finding meaning in the world. Furthermore, it 
may be inconsistent with his theoretical philosophy. This does not mean that he was 
not trying to move beyond the philosophy of his time. In Ecce Home (EH), Nietzsche 
incredulously jokes that “the ‘Nationalzeitung’…could in all seriousness understand 
[BGE] as a ‘sign of the times’” (EC: Books-1). This mistake is just one of the many 
“sins that had been committed against [BGE]” (EC: Books-1). 
Finally, Gardner is too limited in his attempts to unify Nietzsche’s thought. His 
attempt concentrates on what Nietzsche requires at a theoretical level for his practical 
philosophy to make sense. He rightly concludes that the theoretical resources are not 
available. The possibility that Nietzsche’s practical philosophy does not require what 
he theoretically rejects is not explored in detail. Nevertheless, Gardner’s initial 
worries about Nietzsche’s notion of valuing requiring a real self still stand. However, 
rather than invoking the apparently forgotten possibility of Kantian 
transcendentalism, we can locate this self in our psychological structures alone. First, 
we must tackle Stern’s theory of deliberate inconsistency. 
 
3.3 Unstable Foundations 
When Nietzsche scholars talk of psychological structures or subpersonal facts they 
tend to have Nietzschean drives on their minds. Stern (2015) has claimed the 
following. 
 
1) Nietzsche does not have a coherent account of drives. 
2) Drives cannot therefore explain Nietzsche’s account of mind, 
consciousness, self, or the relationship between thought and action. 




Stern suggests that a coherent account of drives is lacking because Nietzsche’s 
psychological project is to highlight different ways of attacking the “Socratic picture” 
of action (Stern, 2015: p.122). This picture is that we can (i) choose between different 
actions, (ii) weigh up our options for action, (iii) act according to the option that we 
think is right, (iv) know the motivations of our actions and (v) be morally judged on 
the basis of our decisions (Stern, 2015: p.122). Nietzsche’s various attacks on this 
picture, it is claimed, neither come from nor develop a positive psychology (Stern, 
2015: p.123). To search for a positive psychology therefore misses the point of 
Nietzsche’s psychological analyses. I will suggest that Nietzsche’s account of 
selfhood is underpinned by his account of drives so we must refute Stern’s claims. I 
will undertake an analysis of the textual examples that Stern offers to support his 
charge of incoherence. We will see that the charge is unwarranted. We will also see 
that Nietzsche suggests that his account of drives is meant to underpin his account of 
selfhood and goes beyond an attack on the Socratic picture. 
Stern argues that Nietzsche’s account of drives is incoherent because he provides 
explicitly inconsistent answers to the following questions. 
 
a) What are drives? 
b) How much can we know about drives? 
c) What is the relationship between drives and conscious deliberation, 
especially in consideration of accounting for action? (Stern, 2015: 
p.123) 
 
Here I will argue against Stern’s treatment of questions (a) and (b). Nietzsche’s 
account of consciousness will be explored later and it is there that I shall tackle (c). 
Stern notes that besides drives, Nietzsche includes in his psychology: tendencies, 
affects and instincts. Instincts tend to be aligned with drives, but tendencies and 
affects appear to be distinct psychological features. Stern suggests a drive (or instinct) 
is best understood as a “nonconscious urge or guiding power that makes a person act 
in a way that seems rational and purposive but that is not in fact (consciously) rational 
or purposive” (Stern, 2015: p.124). Stern also suggests that drives are broadly aligned 
with biological needs. Tendencies are dispositions, tastes, inclinations or propensities 
and often do not appear to be a result of biological needs. For example, one might 
have a disposition for democracy. Affects are understood as powerful emotional 
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stirrings. Such stirrings may not endure in the way that tendencies or drives do. These 
distinctions might sketch some kind of psychological system. Stern notes the 
categories that Nietzsche sometimes puts psychological phenomena into. Species-
preservation may be seen as a biological drive. The desire for democracy could be a 
tendency. Anger might be an affect. Stern objects to such a clear account of 
Nietzschean psychology. (Stern, 2015: p.124-126) 
 
3.4 Drastically Incomplete Psychology 
Stern claims that the above psychological picture is “drastically incomplete - for two 
reasons” (Stern, 2015: p.126). The first problem arises when one notes that 
Nietzsche’s notion of a drive comes from natural history. Animal action may 
sometimes seem purposive and rational, but conscious rationality and purposiveness 
are lacking. Thus, action is explained in terms of drives rather than conscious 
deliberation. However, humans appear to engage in self-conscious deliberation. 
Humans actually are purposive and rational (Stern, 2015: p.126). If drives explain 
behaviour that does not involve conscious deliberation, we need to know how they 
relate to conscious deliberative processes. There are two replies here.  
Firstly, Stern himself claims that Nietzsche attempts to deal with this problem. 
Ultimately, Stern suggests that Nietzsche’s solution is not consistent. However, this 
is a different problem to the one highlighted above. That Nietzsche’s understanding 
and use of drives motivates the problem of consciousness only makes such an 
understanding “drastically incomplete” if no attempt at completion is made. An 
attempt is made and will be explored later. 
Secondly, Stern claims that “one could not apply the same explanations of 
nonconscious behavior to beings with consciousness” (Stern, 2015: p.126). This is 
because conscious deliberation prima facie appears to play a role in causing or 
influencing human behaviour. Stern begs the question here. Consider Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the ‘problem of consciousness’. 
 
“The problem of consciousness…confronts us only when we begin to 
comprehend how we could dispense with it; and now physiology and the 
history of animals place us at the beginning of such comprehension…We 
could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also ‘act’ in every 
sense of that word, and yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our 
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consciousness’…The whole of life would be possible without, as it were, 
seeing itself in the mirror.” (GS: 354) 
 
Consciousness is a problem within a human drive psychology precisely because it 
isn’t necessary for acting or thinking. So Nietzsche needs to determine the role of 
consciousness in human life. Here we can refer back to the first point. 
Stern’s second problem is that Nietzsche’s work does not support a clean division 
of psychological forces. This splits into two points. Firstly, Nietzsche uses different 
psychological terms to label the same phenomena.  
 
“Nietzsche does…refer to revenge as a ‘drive’, ‘affect’ and consequence 
of an affect; elsewhere ‘revenge’ is a nonunivocal term that can mask fear 
(or desire for honor) as the real motive. Yet, fear itself…is variously a 
drive, affect, or a ‘feeling’ that encourages a drive to act…Anger can be 
a drive or an affect; it can also be a neutral state of affairs that a drive can 
interpret in order to express itself.” (Stern, 2015: p.126) 
 
An analysis of the examples here will show that Nietzsche’s labelling of drives is not 
nearly as incoherent as Stern claims. 
Nowhere does Nietzsche claim that revenge, anger or fear are drives. Rather, we 
have drives to revenge, anger or fear. Stern allows Nietzsche an unproblematic 
equating of instincts and drives. In Twilight of the Idol’s (TI) Expeditions-3, 
Nietzsche speaks of “Rousseau’s instinct for revenge”4. Revenge here is not an 
instinct or drive. Rather, Rousseau is said to have an instinct for or drive to revenge. 
Drives do not stand in any conceptual opposition or contradiction to affects, results, 
states of affairs, actions, and so on. Stern’s deeper worry is that we cannot get a handle 
on the drive to revenge because we don’t have a consistent account of revenge. Stern’s 
examples do not sufficiently support this claim. Taking ‘Anger’, Stern suggests that 
it can be either a drive or an affect, but does not offer specific examples. Regardless, 
                                                 
4 Stern (2015: p.126) references “TI ‘Skirmishes’ 6” as a section in which revenge appears. I find no 
mention of revenge or rache in the Hollingdale translation or eKGWB. eKGWB - Published Works - 
Götzen-Dämmerung - ‘Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen’ - 3, contains the closest reference to “Rache” 
as an “Instinkt”. 
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I am inclined to agree and the argument above should alleviate inconsistency here. 
He offers Daybreak (D) 119 as evidence that anger can be a neutral state of affairs 
open to interpretation. 
 
“[A drive] regards every event of the day with a view to seeing how it can 
employ it for the attainment of its goal; whether a man is moving, or 
resting, or angry or reading or speaking or fighting or rejoicing, the drive 
will in its thirst as it were taste every condition into which the man may 
enter, and as a rule will discover nothing for itself there and will have to 
wait and go on thirsting.” 
 
Anger is not a neutral state of affairs here. It is a specific state that a drive “tastes”. 
Stern may get to neutral because of the other states mentioned. Moving, reading and 
even fighting may not carry with them determinate feelings. However, we also have 
the inclusion of rejoicing and there is no need for us to read these different ‘events’ 
as the same kind of thing. Nietzsche’s point is that any of these different events can 
be tasted by a drive. At this point, the drive finds nothing. Anger is so specific that 
the drive cannot interpret it in a way that provides an opportunity for expression. 
There is no suggestion that this event cannot be understood as the experience of an 
affect. This passage does not generate any more inconsistency than the drive or affect 
inconsistency which has already been resolved. 
According to Stern, fear “is variously a drive, affect, or a ‘feeling’ that encourages 
a drive to act” (Stern, 2015: p.126). We learn of “the instinct of fear” (GS: 355), that 
“the cause-creating drive [can be] conditioned and excited by the feeling of fear” (TI: 
Errors-5), that drives can “blend with the depressive emotions, with suspicion, fear, 
dishonour” (TI: Expeditions-45), and that we have a “fear of disgrace” (D: 109). We 
have seen that I can have a drive to fear and fear can be an affect. Stern characterises 
affects as feelings or emotional stirrings (Stern, 2015: p.125). It is hard to see the 
conceptual opposition between fear being an affect and fear being a feeling which can 
initiate or condition action. Fear can be an affect that is just felt, but it may also 
influence action. Stern misses the possible problems with the “instinct of fear”. It 
does not refer to a drive to fear, but an instinct that is activated by fear. On feeling 
fear, one instinctually attempts to reduce that feeling by overcoming or avoiding the 
cause of the fear. This is why we desire knowledge. Fearful of something unfamiliar, 
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we attempt to reduce it “to something familiar” (GS: 355). Here we seem to have a 
drive away from fear. This is activated by a feeling of fear so Nietzsche calls it “the 
instinct of fear”. Fear is easily understood as an affect that can interact with drives. 
We have seen one example of the instinct of revenge from TI. The Gay Science 
(GS) 49 mentions revenge as an act, but also speaks of a drive to revenge, 
“Rachetriebes”, and a thirst for revenge, “Rachedurstes”. Human, All Too Human 
(HH), I-138, has revenge as an action, but also “Rachebedürfnisses”, a need or “thirst 
for revenge”. HH WS-33 suggests that ‘Revenge’ is just a “pocket into which now 
this, now that, now several things at once have been put!” Again, we can make a 
coherent, non-oppositional distinction between a drive to revenge and revenge as an 
act. ‘Thirst’ and ‘need’ may be equivalent to ‘drive’. These are not psychological 
occurrences that figure substantially in their own right throughout Nietzsche’s 
psychology. Thirst is often used, but metaphorically so. On the other hand, thirst 
seems much more temporary than the standard interpretation of a drive. A need may 
also be relatively fleeting. So we could understand Nietzsche as positing an ‘affect to 
revenge’. This is not to say that revenge is an affect. The idea is that we can desire 
revenge due to a fleeting feeling rather than an enduring drive. This will be explored 
in my last reply to Stern’s worry. So far we are not struggling to understand what 
‘revenge’ is. It is an act that one might perform because of an enduring drive or brief 
desire for vengeance. HH WS-33 is more problematic. ‘Revenge’ is just a word that 
can refer to all sorts of things. Acts of revenge can be committed out of self-
preservation, desires to hurt, desires for restitution, in order to restore one’s honour 
and in order to prove one’s lack of fear for one’s opponent. Nietzsche broadly speaks 
of two species of action here, revenge as self-preservation and revenge as a desire to 
hurt. This second species is gradually collapsed into the demonstration of one’s 
fearlessness. Nietzsche is ambiguous about what this collapsing amounts to as he 
states that it is only for “some people that the danger to themselves involved in 
revenge…counts as an indispensable condition of the revenge” (HH: WS-33). Given 
Nietzsche’s key idea, that revenge is committed for a variety of reasons, it seems as 
though he has in mind more than two species of action. Furthermore, when he 
discusses the revenge of society, punishment, he suggests that such revenge is 
performed in order to both self-preserve and deter future opponents (HH: WS-33). 
Despite its many potential causes, ‘revenge’ is understood as a unique kind of act, the 
performing of a “counter-blow” (HH: WS-33). The problem is not that there is no 
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such thing as an act of revenge, but that there doesn’t seem to be a drive to revenge 
because revenge is just an expression of, for example, the drive to self-preservation. 
However, a drive to revenge can be included in our mental economy as one of many 
potential drives that can express themselves with vengeful acts. Nietzsche’s aim is to 
draw up a non-exhaustive list of the motivational forces that may be at work in a 
specific act. The further aim is to suggest that in committing acts of revenge we are 
often ignorant of the forces at play. This does not preclude the notion that one can be 
motivated to minister a counter-blow for the ‘simple reason’ of acting in such a way. 
Just as one may have a drive to experience specific affects, one may have a drive to 
perform specific actions. Thus, Rousseau can be said to have a drive to revenge in 
that he seeks opportunities for administering counter-blows. Perhaps he sought 
opportunities for viewing himself as under attack so that he could react to such 
attacks. This is different to seeking opportunities for violence or self-preservation 
which are not necessarily reactive. Positing a drive to revenge does not commit us or 
Nietzsche to the claim that acts of revenge or the concept of revenge have a single 
“conceptual or perceptional root” (HH: WS-33). The conceptual roots of revenge are 
manifold. When we call an act ‘revenge’ we wrongly think that we thereby uncover 
a single motivational force. That an act is a counter-blow does not mean that it is 
motivated by the drive to revenge, but neither does it mean that it cannot have been 
so motivated. We cannot interpret this passage in isolation. Given that Nietzsche 
mentions the drive to revenge elsewhere and that this passage does not explicitly 
refute the existence of such a drive, there is no overriding reason to charge Nietzsche 
with inconsistency regarding revenge. 
A final point should dissuade a Stern-style reading of other ambiguous passages. 
Stern accuses Nietzsche of a problematic “overlapping labelling” of psychological 
phenomena (Stern, 2015: p.126). I have suggested that this does not occur to a 
worrying extent. Here we can allow Stern more than he should be allowed. We should 
still struggle to see why this is uniquely problematic for a coherent account of 
Nietzschean psychology. Take someone who desires to have sex with their partner. 
We could explain this in a number of ways. Firstly, they might have an active 
biological instinct to procreate. Secondly, they might have a tendency to desire sex. 
They may be disposed to desire as much sex as possible. Finally, they might be 
momentarily sexually attracted to their partner and have a fleeting desire to have sex 
with them. The point is that very similar psychological phenomena cannot always be 
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understood in exactly the same way. One person might be an ‘angry person’ disposed 
to constantly become angry, another might be a ‘calm person’ racked by a sudden fit 
of anger. There is no reason why Nietzsche must suggest that anger or sexual desire 
must always be the result of or constituted by either a biological drive or a tendency 
or an affect and that they cannot be understood in different ways at different times in 
different people. A highly rigorous account of psychology may be able to carefully 
label phenomena. Perhaps sexual desire should be labelled differently to a need to 
procreate. However, the most we can accuse Nietzsche of here is sloppiness rather 
than incoherence. He may not be systematic and rigorous enough by analytic 
standards. His labelling may require a bit of interpretation and unpacking, but we can 
still get at what Nietzsche may be claiming at different times. I am not suggesting that 
Nietzsche uses his labels interchangeably such that in a given instance of anger he 
may call it an affect or drive or disposition, but that these labels explain essentially 
the same phenomenon (Stern, 2015: p.127). The point is that they do not explain the 
exact same phenomenon. The cause of a sexual desire can be understood in different 
ways depending on the subject. A different label does not describe the same kind of 
thing as any other label even though the result of a biological need or sudden affect 
may be the same. A drive to anger and the affect of anger are not the same thing. 
However, we and Nietzsche may sometimes become confused or terminologically 
sloppy because both the drive and affect might be phenomenologically and 
motivationally similar. This approach easily overcomes Stern’s worry that 
interchangeable labels cannot account for the fact that drives may be opposed to 
affects, affects may be socially attached to certain drives, and so on (Stern, 2015: 
p.127-8). I maintain the distinction between different psychological phenomena so 
that they can interact with each other. An individual may even feel anger (affect) at 
the fact that they have a drive towards anger. 
Stern’s additional charge of incompleteness highlights the vast amount of things 
that Nietzsche labels as drives. Some drives seem to have no natural biological basis, 
others don’t seem to occur in all humans and some seem to presuppose or require 
consciousness. The upshot of this for Stern is that Nietzsche provides no account of 
what ties all of these things together. There is no “common point of reference” (Stern, 




Drive: A relatively enduring disposition that aims to engage an individual in a certain 
activity and manifests itself regardless of environmental or subjective stimuli by 
informing an individual’s perception of objects, generating evaluative orientations 
towards objects and bringing about action.5 
 
This definition does not contradict any of Stern’s important considerations. It allows 
us to include in the pantheon of drives: biological needs, socially inherited 
dispositions, dispositions that we are conscious of, dispositions that require 
consciousness (though not autonomous conscious control), dispositions that not all 
humans have, and so on. There are two things to clarify. 
Stern initially distinguishes between tendencies or dispositions (Hang) and drives 
(Instinkt or Triebe). This could block a dispositional drive definition. Nietzsche’s 
notion of a drive is taken from natural history. This is why Stern is happy to broadly 
equate drives with instincts. When Nietzsche uses Hang, it often denotes dispositions 
that don’t tend to have a recognisable biological basis (Stern, 2015: p.124-5). 
However, Stern also notes that Nietzsche appears to use Hang, Instinkt and Triebe 
interchangeably. Thus, the only block to a dispositional drive definition is a purely 
biological interpretation of drives. Stern thinks we should reject such an interpretation 
because even some Nietzschean instincts appear to be non-biological (Stern, 2015: 
p.127). This suggests that Triebe can be interpreted as interchangeable with both 
Hang and Instinkt. Some drives have a biological basis, others do not. Contrary to 
Stern, this does not amount to the blocking of a coherent account of drives. Rather, 
we should simply be hesitant to interpret the broad notion of Nietzschean drives as 
naturalistic in the sense that they always have a biological basis. By Stern’s own 
lights, rejecting a purely biological understanding of drives would not be ad hoc after 
defining drives dispositionally because some instincts also appear to be non-
biological. This leads to the second point. 
Contextually and textually it is relatively clear that Nietzsche takes the notion of a 
drive from natural history. This does not mean that Nietzsche’s conception of drives 
does not move beyond such an understanding. There are distinctly human drives 
                                                 
5 That drives aim at specific activities and manifest themselves regardless of stimuli precludes 
dispositional beliefs, concepts, and so on, from being understood as drives. Even on a functional, 
dispositional view of belief, my belief that lions are dangerous only manifests itself and initiates 




within Nietzsche’s pantheon. Whether or not such drives can be read naturalistically 
or have a biological basis, Nietzsche has a unique understanding of drives and does 
not obviously tether himself to any prior understanding of the term. 
That Nietzsche labels so many things as drives may be problematic, we might 
disagree with his analysis of the mind and action. Furthermore, Nietzsche may never 
give us an explicit definition of drives. However, none of this makes his account of 
drives fundamentally incoherent or blocks the move to find the unifying 
characteristics of drives. 
 
3.5 The Epistemology of Drives 
Stern’s next worry focuses on our knowledge of drives.  
 
“I know of no attempt at an explanation anywhere in the literature - 
Nietzsche’s or secondary - as to how Nietzsche can both hold that drive 
activity is in great part nonconscious, unknowable to individuals, and 
necessarily poorly conceptualized and claim intricate knowledge of the 
workings of the drives of others.” (Stern, 2015: p.129) 
 
Nietzsche is sceptical about self-knowledge. He claims that: “However far a man may 
go in self-knowledge, nothing…can be more incomplete than his image of the totality 
of drives that constitute his being” (D: 119). This is influenced by Nietzsche’s idea 
that “the greatest part of our spirit’s activity remains unconscious and unfelt” (GS: 
333). However, Nietzsche goes further than disparaging remarks about the possibility 
of self-knowledge. For two reasons, the linguistic conceptualisation of drives often, 
if not always, involves a degree of falsification. Firstly, it is only the extreme mental 
phenomena that arise to consciousness. Much else occurs below the surface which, 
unaware of it, we cannot linguistically conceptualise (D: 115). Secondly, linguistic 
concepts arise out of the need to communicate within society. The generation of 
language is the generation of a shared sign-language. The concept of anger designates 
a shared state, one that we can all experience. However, “all our actions are 
incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual” (GS: 354). As knowledge 
is based on our linguistic concepts, we can only ever come to know “what is not 
individual but ‘average’” (GS: 354. TL: 1). This ‘knowledge’ fails to properly capture 
the causes of our actions. 
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Nietzsche’s claims about self-knowledge are unproblematic. Just because it is 
subjectively difficult to ascertain the exact machinations of our minds it does not 
follow that an outside observer will face the same challenges. Furthermore, 
Nietzsche’s aspersions on self-knowledge are not largely concerned with our 
knowledge of basic desires or superficial reasons for action or belief. They are 
focused on knowledge of deeper, underlying psychological processes. Stern rejects 
an appeal to Nietzsche’s claim that he is a “psychologist who has not his equal” (EH: 
Books-5). However, such a psychologist is surely warranted to make claims about the 
mind that most individuals cannot because of their psychological ignorance. This is 
so even if other-knowledge is also difficult for the majority of individuals. Nietzsche 
may not have been a great psychologist, but that he sees himself in this way shows 
why he does not consider aspersions on self-knowledge to constitute a block on his 
psychological knowledge.  
The more pressing problem is that the conceptualisation of drives at least often 
falsifies those drives and fails to capture the mind’s subtleties. This does appear to 
contradict Nietzsche’s liberal labelling of drives and claims of deep psychological 
understanding. However, Nietzsche does not claim knowledge of the specificities of 
the milder forces that work beneath the consciously experienced extreme forces. He 
does not attempt to name or conceptualise them. His claim to knowledge is that milder 
forces are undoubtedly at work despite our ignorance of the details. As they work 
beneath consciousness, this does no harm to his view that unknown psychological 
forces are often the real causes of action rather than conscious deliberation6. In D 115, 
Nietzsche states that “anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain - all are 
names for extreme states”. Nietzsche is aware that much of his psychological analysis 
deals in phenomena that only capture part of the story. This does not prevent him 
from providing insightful and subversive commentary on the history of our actions 
and beliefs because our self-knowledge often confuses, misses and wrongly interprets 
even these extreme states. Nietzsche claims that “where words are lacking, we are 
accustomed to abandon exact observation because exact thinking here becomes 
painful; indeed, in earlier times one involuntarily concluded that where the realm of 
words ceased the realm of existence ceased also” (D: 115). Nietzsche suggests that 
we must at least accept that psychological existence continues beyond our ken. We 
                                                 
6 Conscious deliberation is explored in section 4.3. 
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can then attempt to painfully think about this unknown and the consequences of such 
an unknown existence. We can read Nietzsche as doing the best he can with linguistic 
tools. His claims about falsifying conceptualisation are admittances of the limitations 
of his psychological analyses. Nevertheless, though he may miss the mark when 
labelling a drive, a drive still exists. This may also account for the vast amount of 
drives and ways of describing them. Nietzsche can be seen as trying, again and again, 
to get a more accurate picture of drives. He views them in different ways, offers 
different explanations of their behaviour and origins, and so on, in the hope of 
reaching a more comprehensive understanding. He is capable of dissecting the 
extreme states to a degree. His analyses of pity, compassion, revenge, knowledge, 
and so on, go beyond our blunt and superficial understanding. However, he is aware 
that more could always be said, or if not said, acknowledged. 
 
3.6 The Socratic Picture 
Stern claims that despite his lack of a coherent psychological theory, “Nietzsche did 
have…a very clear picture of the target he wanted to attack” (Stern, 2015: p.122). 
This target is the Socratic picture of action. 
The sole aim of Nietzsche’s psychological analyses is to attack the Socratic picture 
and to do this he does not need to provide a coherent theory of his own. Consistency 
cannot and should not be found because it misconstrues Nietzsche’s goal. This 
suggestion doesn’t get off the ground. We saw above the idea that drives constitute 
our being. Elsewhere we learn that a philosopher’s “morality bears decided and 
decisive evidence to who he is - that is to say, to the order of rank the innermost drives 
of his nature stand in relative to one another” (BGE: 6). Furthermore, the soul should 
be conceived of “as [a] social structure of the drives and emotions” (BGE: 12). This 
has implications for Nietzsche’s practical philosophy that focuses on affirming one’s 
being and becoming what one is (GS: 270, 335. TSZ: Honey Offering). It is unclear 
what Stern would make of these moments. He claims that “it is often suggested” that 
Nietzsche bases his account of self and mind on the drives (Stern, 2015: p.121). 
Drives thereby provide the foundation for his practical philosophy. Stern seems to see 
these suggestions as the suggestions of scholars. It is clear that Nietzsche makes such 
suggestions himself, hence the scholarly attention. Despite the focus of his paper, 




We are yet to see if Nietzsche has a coherent account of drive-based selfhood that 
supports his practical work. However, we can see that Nietzsche does conceive of 
drives as of great importance to an understanding of who we are. Even if Nietzsche 
ultimately fails to provide a coherent account of drives, we are warranted in our search 
for one. 
 
4 - Drives and Consciousness 
 
4.1 Drives as Dispositions 
Nietzsche provides no precise definition of a drive. This ambiguity is interpretively 
translated into defining drives as anything from politically related homunculi (Thiele, 
1990: p.57) to naturalistically articulated dispositions (Richardson, 2004: p.38-39). 
Drives will be central to my account of Nietzschean selfhood and we therefore require 
a stable drive definition. The aim here is to arrive at a definition that is congruous 
with Nietzsche’s text and my interpretation of Nietzschean selfhood. Katsafanas’ 
(2016) recent exploration of drives provides a useful foundation for this endeavour. I 
will highlight some textual objections and corrections to the details of his analysis, 
but I otherwise follow Katsafanas’ understanding of drives as a certain type of 
disposition. 
Drives appear to be motivational states, urges or cravings. Stern finds only one 
reference to hunger as a drive in Nietzsche’s published work (D: 119), but it is states 
like hunger that drives bring to mind (Stern, 2015: p.126). However, drives evaluate 
the world (HH: I-32) and have perspectives (NF-1885: 1-58. NF-1886: 7-60). 
Nietzsche even tells us that drives “have all at some time or other practised 
philosophy - and that each one of them would be only too glad to present itself as the 
ultimate goal of existence and as the legitimate master of all the other drives. For 
every drive is tyrannical: and it is as such that it tries to philosophize” (BGE: 6). 
Drives appear to exhibit agential abilities in that we commonly think of only self-
conscious agents as being capable of evaluation and philosophy. (Katsafanas, 2016: 
p.78-80) 
This leads to the homunculi view of drives as “agents-within-agents” (Katsafanas, 
2016: p.80). Katsafanas canvasses a few versions of this interpretation and notes some 
philosophical objections to it (2016: p.80-83). For our purposes, the important 
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objection is that the homunculi reading is incongruous with Nietzsche’s project 
regarding agency and selfhood. Nietzsche “condemned himself to inventing [a] new” 
conception of self after rejecting the traditional notion of a soul (BGE: 12). Perhaps 
this new conception was simply the idea that we are made up of many selves rather 
than one. This would amount to a fundamental acceptance of the traditional 
conception of selfhood and agency. The claim would simply be that more agents exist 
within each individual than we previously thought. However, Nietzsche argues that 
our conception of selfhood and agency is drastically mistaken. (Katsafanas, 2016: 
p.84) 
The opposite interpretation is the disposition view of drives. For example, Janaway 
has suggested “that a drive is a relatively stable tendency to active behaviour of some 
kind” (Janaway, 2007: p.214). I will defend this view, but it needs finessing. Not all 
dispositions are drives, but drives are a species of disposition. They are dispositions 
that evaluate and have perspectives on the world. 
Richardson suggests that “a Nietzschean drive is a disposition that was selected 
for a certain result; the result is its individuating goal, which explains its presence and 
its character” (Richardson, 2004: p.39). Following this, “a drive’s values are precisely 
the goals it drives toward”7 (Richardson, 2004: p.13). Katsafanas objects that being 
disposed towards sexual activity does not always amount to valuing such activity. For 
example, an ascetic might not value sexual activity despite being naturally disposed 
towards it (Katsafanas, 2016: p.85). 
Our elucidatory project at present is to understand how drives evaluate. 
Katsafanas’ criticism is that an individual’s values can come apart from the goals of 
some of their dispositions. However, Richardson is not claiming that a drive evaluates 
because an individual values its end. The claim is that the value of a drive is the goal 
to which it disposes the individual in which it inheres. Katsafanas needs to show that 
a drive’s value can come apart from the goal towards which it strives. As Richardson 
equates such things, on this analysis, no separation can occur. With the preceding 
amendment, we have an ascetic with a sex drive that values sex, but the ascetic does 
not value sex. Katsafanas’ problem seems to be that because Nietzsche says our 
                                                 
7 We can remain agnostic about Richardson’s Darwinian characterisation of drives whilst holding onto 
this understanding of the values of drives. 
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values come from our drives, the ascetic must value sex. However, drives can be 
opposed to each other. 
 
“While ‘we’ believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, 
at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about another; that is to 
say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of 
a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or even 
more vehement drive.” (D: 109) 
 
Katsafanas’ objection only succeeds if the ascetic has no drives that might be opposed 
to sexual activity, but this is an absurd suggestion. An individual’s values are not 
determined by all of their drives at once, but by dominant drives. Drives aim to master 
each other and it is when a drive achieves mastery that it succeeds in presenting “itself 
[and its value] as the ultimate goal of existence” (BGE: 6). Katsafanas could suggest 
that the good ascetic does not struggle with his sex drive, but simply disvalues sex. 
We can turn here to another key idea. 
 
“Every moment of our lives sees some of the polyp-arms [(drives)] of our 
being grow and others of them wither, all according to the nutriment 
which the moment does or does not bear with it.” (D: 119) 
 
The strength of drives waxes and wanes. The weaker a drive, the less we are aware 
of it. Thus, the good ascetic, whilst having a natural sex drive, is relatively unmoved 
by it. His other drives are so successful in suppressing its expression that the ascetic 
cannot value sex. 
The values of drives are the ends which drives seek. Individuals value certain ends 
depending on which drive or drives are dominant. Importantly, drives do not just 
respond to stimuli. When they are active, they seek expression. 
 
“Suppose a drive finds itself at the point at which it desires 
gratification…it then regards every event of the day with a view to seeing 
how it can employ it for the attainment of its goal…the drive will in its 




Often these conditions or events offer no obvious nourishment to the drive. So drives 
do not just have values, they evaluate situations in terms of their suitability for 
expression (D: 119). This involves perspectival interpretation. We can understand 
this in two ways. 
Firstly, drives evaluate the world by altering the way we perceive it. When drives 
are strong enough, we are compulsively motivated to achieve their ends. We seek 
opportunities for such achievement. If a situation affords an opportunity it is 
evaluated positively, if not, negatively. Katsafanas, by lengthy and complicated 
analysis, cashes this out in terms of affective orientations (Katsafanas, 2016: p.95-
106). It is relatively common to understand Nietzschean affects as being constituted 
in part by inclination or aversion towards some object (Katsafanas, 2016: p.103-4). 
Katsafanas suggests that drives evaluate the world by inducing affective orientations 
towards certain objects that amount to evaluations (Katsafanas, 2016: p.102). The 
above analysis fits with this idea and can be put in simple terms. When a drive is 
active it induces affective orientations towards objects that will satisfy it and vice 
versa. We thereby affectively perceive and evaluate the world in different ways 
depending on our active drives. 
The second aspect of perspectival drives is more complicated. As drives constantly 
seek expression, Nietzsche is often interpreted as claiming that “drives do not await 
occasions for expression, but create them” (Katsafanas, 2016: p.100). One way they 
do this is to affectively incline us towards certain objects. However, they may go 
further than this. In D 119 Nietzsche notes that despite the fact that the nervous stimuli 
received when sleeping are relatively constant each night, we have a wide variety of 
dreams. This variety depends on the different drives that are active each night. The 
drive to “adventurousness” might ‘create’ an adventurous dream to satisfy itself (D: 
119). Nietzsche claims that waking life, whilst not as free, is no different. Katsafanas 
interprets Nietzsche as claiming that drives alter the content of experience in order to 
incline “the agent to see certain actions as warranted” (Katsafanas, 2016: p.100). 
However, the second way that drives alter the content of experience is explanatory 
rather than justificatory. 
Nietzsche claims that “drives…do nothing but interpret nervous stimuli 
and…posit their ‘causes’” (D: 119). Katsafanas interprets ‘cause’ as ‘justificatory 
warrant’. The claim is not that we consider ourselves justified in seeking situations to 
satisfy a drive, it is that we perceive the world as justifying certain responses that will 
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satisfy the drive. Drives “will induce an orientation that inclines the agent to take 
steps toward fulfilling the drive, by making it appear as if taking these steps is 
warranted by the situation” (Katsafanas, 2016: p.102). So if the drive to 
aggressiveness is active, we must find a reason for aggression before it can be 
satisfied. Leaving aside various notions and degrees of rational agency, we can see 
that this is wrong.  
We do not need to perceive of situations as always warranting certain actions or 
responses. Consider two examples. Firstly, my drive to adventure is active. I see a 
mountain and decide to climb it. What warrants my climb is the very fact that I am 
feeling adventurous. The situation is useful, but ultimately redundant. The mountain 
does not rationally require exploration, I just want to explore it. If the mountain is 
tough, my drive is satisfied. However, this toughness explains rather than justifies my 
satisfaction. Second, consider dreams, Nietzsche’s starting point. It seems almost 
absurd to suggest that in sleep I take warranted steps towards fulfilling a drive. My 
drive to music is active and I experience the beating of my eyelids on the pillow as 
an intricate rhythm. The drive is satisfied because I hear music, not because I have 
taken warranted steps to hear music. This uncovers the correct interpretation. 
Whilst I sleep there is no music playing. Drives alter our perception of the world 
not by positing justification for their satisfaction, but explanatory causes for their 
activation and satisfaction. In dreams our imagination can run wild. In waking life we 
are limited, but we perceive the aspects of a situation that explain why we feel a 
certain way. Consider Nietzsche’s laugher in the market. If the drive to reflection is 
active, the passer-by reflects on the nature of laughter (D: 119). This is not because 
the passer-by views the laughter as justifying reflection, but because they are in a 
reflective mood. One then posits the laughter as the cause of reflection. Nietzsche’s 
insight is to suggest that the drive, not the laughter, is the real cause of our reflection. 
However, we falsely interpret it to the contrary. None of this is to say that we cannot 
view explanatory causes as justificatory, the point is that drives do not always need 
to make their satisfaction seem justified by an event. 
We must turn finally to an understanding of the goals of drives. Drives constantly 





“The aim of a drive is its characteristic form of activity…In order for a 
drive to be expressed, one needs an object. The drive itself is indifferent 
to the object; the drive simply seeks expression. So the aggressive drive 
will seek to vent itself on whatever object happens to be present.” 
(Katsafanas, 2016: p.101) 
 
Drives aim to engage an individual in a certain activity. They seek to engage us in 
such activities indefinitely. The aim of the drive to knowledge is the acquisition of 
knowledge, whatever that knowledge may amount to. We must be careful with our 
understanding of activity so as to not overly focus on specific actions. A drive initiates 
action not necessarily because its goal is a specific act. We can engage in the 
characteristic activities of drives through a variety of actions. When starving, my 
drive to self-preservation motivates me to eat. In a fight, it motivates me to fight back. 
Despite Nietzsche’s liberal labelling of drives, he never claims that all actions have a 
corresponding drive. Rather, our actions, beliefs, and so on, are explained by the ways 
in which different drives, via their characteristic activity, make us react to and 
interpret the world. 
Drives are dispositions that motivate certain kinds of activity. The activities they 
motivate are seen as the drives’ values and an individual’s values reflect their 
dominant drives. Drives evaluate the world by making us perceive certain situations 
as offering or withholding opportunities for their satisfaction. Furthermore, drives 
make us perceive objects as causes of their activation and satisfaction, when in fact 
drives satisfy themselves through chance objects. Thus our definition of a drive. 
  
Drive: A relatively enduring disposition that aims to engage an individual in a certain 
activity and manifests itself regardless of environmental or subjective stimuli by 
informing an individual’s perception of objects, generating evaluative orientations 









4.2 The Function of Consciousness 
We must now tackle Stern’s worry about Nietzsche’s treatment of consciousness. 
After examining Nietzsche’s account of the function of consciousness, we will 
explore the relationship between drives and conscious deliberation.  
Nietzsche’s most prominent and clear analysis of consciousness is found in GS 
354. In section 2.4 we saw that here Nietzsche claims all of life could occur without 
consciousness. Yet it does not. Nietzsche contends that consciousness, and self-
consciousness, “developed only under the pressure of the need for communication” 
(GS: 354). To communicate our needs, we had to know what these needs were. 
Consciousness develops as a “net of communication between human beings” (GS: 
354). Such communication has a linguistic form. With a shared linguistic sign-
language we gained the “ability to fix” our feelings so that we could communicate 
them (GS: 354). Thus, “the development of language and the development of 
consciousness (not of reason but merely the way reason enters consciousness) go 
hand in hand” (GS: 354). The more words we invented to fix our feelings, the more 
we could know and think about ourselves. Nietzsche claims that “only…conscious 
thinking takes the form of words” (GS: 354). So consciousness is merely a linguistic 
awareness of oneself. The focus on conscious thinking is key here. Thinking is 
something we usually conceive of as only occurring consciously. However, for 
Nietzsche, thinking is “nothing but a certain behaviour of the instincts toward one 
another” (GS: 333), it is “only the relationship of…drives to one another” (BGE: 36). 
Thus, conscious thought is linguistic awareness of drive behaviour. 
Katsafanas notes that, for Nietzsche, “words are sounds designating concepts” 
(BGE: 268) (Katsafanas, 2016: p.25). Consciousness is not a substantive faculty that 
allows for thinking, deliberation or reasoning. Rather, it is conceptual awareness of 
these and other phenomena. Consciousness is no more than a property of mental 
states (Katsafanas, 2016: p.21). 
 
4.3 Conscious Deliberation 
The above should assuage Stern’s initial worries about Nietzsche’s ‘problem of 
consciousness’. Nietzsche explains human behaviour in terms of drives, but 
consciousness has a clear role in our lives and history. It is there to facilitate 
communication. However, perhaps Nietzsche is forgetting that consciousness might 
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have developed beyond its origins into a substantive faculty8. A careful reading of GS 
refutes this suggestion.  
 
“Even now…the greatest portion of our life actually takes place without 
this mirror effect.” (GS: 354, emphasis added).  
 
The fact that conscious thinking is simply thinking conceptualised “uncovers the 
origin of consciousness” (GS: 354). Nietzsche is working backwards from an 
observation of contemporary humanity. 
Whatever the ambiguity surrounding drive definition, how they relate to conscious 
deliberation is perhaps the most important thing to understand. Stern claims that 
Nietzsche explicitly supports opposing ways in which drives relate to such 
deliberation. 
 
1) “Overrule: The drives overrule our conscious deliberations. 
2) Manipulate: The drives manipulate our conscious deliberations. 
3) Epiphenomenalist: Only the drives are causally efficacious; our 
conscious deliberations are epiphenomenal. 
4) Reductive: There aren’t conscious deliberations, as we typically 
understand them, at all; there are only drives.” (Stern, 2015: p.130) 
 
(1) And (2) can be understood in three different ways: strong, weak and epistemic. 
Drives might always overrule or manipulate deliberations, drives might sometimes 
overrule or manipulate, or we never know if drives are overruling or manipulating. 
(1) - (3) hold that conscious deliberations and drives are different things. (4) holds 
that, essentially, they are not (Stern, 2015: p.130-32). All of these claims can in fact 
fit into a coherent psychology. 
First, we must distinguish between two conceptions of conscious deliberation. 
Such deliberation could be the activity of drives. Alternatively, it might be the activity 
of something distinct from the drives (X). We can elucidate these approaches in 
broadly Kantian or Humean terms.  
                                                 
8 Nietzsche is sceptical about the existence or explanatory role of faculties (BGE: 11). 
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Consider the self-legislation of ends. For Kant, the will is “a faculty of self-
determination, independent of the necessitation through sensible impulses [(drives)]” 
(C: B562). Whilst the will is affected by drives, it can suspend their influence as it is 
distinct from them. Deliberation is not determined by drives. Wood (1999, p.51) 
writes that, for Kant, “not only do rational beings have the capacity to resist impulses, 
but even when the rational faculty…acts on…impulses, it is never determined by 
them”. Furthermore, an ‘I’ exists as a formal condition for thought and thought is an 
activity of this ‘I’ (C: B407). Conscious deliberation is the activity of an ‘I’ and the 
legislation of ends is performed by a will that is distinct from the drives.  
For Hume, reason is a faculty that is a “slave of the passions [(drives)]” (Treatise: 
II-III-III). Reason is not constituted by and does not allow for the suspension of drive 
influence. It is a faculty that is used and controlled by drives. Our ends are legislated 
by drives, reason simply aids us in determining how to achieve these ends. This leads 
to two understandings of reasoning. 
Firstly, reasoning may be considered the activity of deciding our ends. Secondly, 
reasoning may be the activity of ascertaining the best way of pursuing an end. 
Nietzsche is clear that the first kind of reasoning is accounted for by ‘drive 
deliberation’. Drive deliberation is the interplay of drives such that the decision to 
tackle the vehemence of a drive is made by another drive (D: 109). Nietzsche views 
thought as the interaction of drives (GS: 333). In GS 354 we learn that reason can 
arise to consciousness, but being nothing more than the interaction of drives, can 
occur unconsciously. Here Nietzsche has in mind our first kind of reasoning, that of 
deciding what to do. He rejects the notion that such deliberation is performed by or 
requires an ‘I’ or will that is distinct from the drives (X). 
The activity of deciding how to achieve an end might only occur consciously. 
Some means-end reasoning may require consciousness as it involves conceptual 
thought. We will soon see that drives can utilise concepts to achieve their ends. Here 
we can say that consciousness, as conceptual awareness of the world and ourselves, 
may provide us with the capacity for means-end reasoning. However, the way in 
which this capacity is used is determined by drives. The capacity is passive in and of 
itself. Means-end reasoning is viewed in a Humean light. “Mathematics…are useful 
in…almost every art and profession: But ‘tis not of themselves they have any 
influence” (Treatise: II-III-III). The ways in which concepts, mathematical or 
otherwise, influence action are determined by drives. Means-end reasoning may 
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require consciousness, but it remains an activity of the drives. As consciousness 
amounts to conceptual awareness of psychological processes, means-end reasoning 
might not be a process that is necessarily conscious. Means-end reasoning may also 
occur unconsciously. 
We can now better see the two understandings of conscious deliberation. 
Conscious deliberation may be the capacity to suspend the influence of drives and set 
oneself ends that are not determined by drives (X-deliberation). Alternatively, 
conscious deliberation may amount to consciousness of drive deliberation. Means-
end reasoning may require consciousness. However, it is still drives that deliberate as 
they utilise this capacity to achieve their ends. 
X-deliberation is reductively eliminated by Nietzsche. There is no X, be it a 
faculty-will or ‘I’. So there is no such thing as X-deliberation and it can be reduced 
to drive activity. Nevertheless, we have the concept and phenomenological 
experience of X-deliberation. The concept of X-deliberation is that an X exists which 
can suspend the influence of drives. The experience of X-deliberation is the feeling 
that one, as an X free from drive determination, is actually setting oneself ends. This 
is the target of Nietzsche’s epiphenomenalist claims. The phenomenological 
experience of X-deliberation, whilst real given our false understanding of selfhood 
and deliberation, is epiphenomenal. 
Conscious deliberation is efficacious when it amounts to consciousness of drive 
deliberation. We do not need to be conscious of this activity for a decision to be 
reached. However, we become conscious of the activity when it is linguistically 
conceptualised. Conscious deliberation is not reducible to mere drive behaviour 
because it is drive behaviour that we are conceptually aware of. However, its efficacy 
is reducible to the efficacy of drives. Importantly, not everything we are conscious of 
is efficacious. It is only when we are conscious of action or decision causing drives 
that conscious deliberation can be said to be efficacious. So consciousness can be 
efficacious in two ways. 
 
a) Derivative: Conscious deliberation is efficacious when it amounts to 
awareness of efficacious drives. 
b) Instrumental: Consciousness can be instrumentally efficacious as it 
provides the capacity for conceptual means-end reasoning. 
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The overrule and manipulation claims are therefore that, despite conscious 
deliberation’s causal efficaciousness, nonconscious drives often manipulate and 
overrule conscious deliberations. This is because nonconscious drives work in much 
more varied, subtle and perhaps powerful ways than those of which we are conscious. 
We can accept weak versions of manipulate and overrule so that both can occur. 
Retaining Stern’s insights, we can say that Nietzsche sometimes discusses 
conscious deliberation on his own terms, as conceptual awareness of drive activity, 
and at others he discusses it in terms of X-deliberation that is free from drive 
determination. He may unsystematically move between these understandings of 
deliberation, but we can, with a little unpacking, find a coherent understanding of the 
relation between drives and conscious deliberation. 
 
4.4 The Effect of Concepts 
Efficacious conscious deliberation amounts to conceptual awareness of drive 
interplay. However, the concepts by which we become aware of ourselves can have 
an effect on our lives.  
In GM II-16 Nietzsche explicates the “bad conscience”. When humans came to 
live socially certain drives, such as the drives to “hostility [and] cruelty”, were 
supressed (GM: II-16). However, these drives do not wither away. When “the external 
venting of human instinct has been inhibited” it turns inwards (GM: II-16). The social 
individual, “for want of external enemies and resistance impatiently tears, persecutes, 
gnaws, disturbs [and] mistreats himself”. They have “no choice but to transform 
[themselves] into an adventure, a place of torture” (GM: II-16). This internal situation 
creates the “bad conscience” which is a “sickness” born out of “man’s suffering from 
man, from himself” (GM: II-16). 
When Christianity seizes society, this bad conscience is conceptualised as 
religious guilt. We become conscious of the bad conscience as guilt. This is a guilt 
about one’s own nature. Our animal instincts are inimical to God, but we cannot rid 
ourselves of them. Thus, “man will find himself guilty…to a point beyond the 
possibility of atonement” (GM: II-22). This has three consequences. Firstly, because 
we suffer from guilt, our drive to cruelty seeks to increase our feeling of guilt, which 
is the bad conscience. Secondly, suffering has meaning. We suffer because we are 
guilty and deserve to be punished (GM: III-20). Finally, the guiltier we are, the more 
punishment we deserve. We seek more suffering as punishment and this again is an 
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expression of our drive to cruelty. “The bad conscience takes root, eating its way in, 
spreading down and out like a polyp” (GM: II-21). 
Concepts can have profound consequences for our lives. We might be tempted to 
say that consciousness is efficacious in its own right because it is constituted by 
conceptual awareness. However, concepts are simply tools that drives use to express 
themselves and until they are seized by drives they are inert. One only internalises 
the concept of guilt and seeks further self-suffering if one’s drive to cruelty is active 
and venting inwardly. ‘Internalisation’ refers to becoming self-conscious of oneself 
as guilty. If the drive to cruelty can vent outwardly, it has no need for the concept of 
guilt. For example, Ancient Greeks allowed their drives to cruelty sufficient external 
gratification that they did not need to make themselves suffer by conceiving of 
themselves as guilty (GM: II-23). Finally, concepts have their origins in long social 
histories. Thus, we, or our drives, do not have control over the concepts that are 
available to us. Drives have control over the internalisation of concepts and the uses 
to which they are put. “This man of bad conscience [assumes] control of the religious 
presupposition in order to carry his self-punishment to the most horrific pitch of harsh 
intensity” (GM: II-22).  
We now have a framework in place for understanding Nietzschean selfhood. 
 
5 - Nietzsche’s Self 
 
5.1 Anderson’s Emergentism 
We have seen a number of quotations from BGE 12 that suggest that Nietzsche aimed 
to redefine selfhood. The self is a “social structure of the drives and emotions [or 
affects]” (BGE: 12). This gives rise to three questions. 
 
1) What kind of structure amounts to a self? 
2) Why can this structure be called a self? 
3) How does this understanding of selfhood fit with Nietzsche’s 
practical philosophy? 
 
Anderson (2012) has attempted to answer these questions. His nuanced paper 
highlights what we need from a drive-based account of Nietzschean selfhood. Most 
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notably, he captures Nietzsche’s notion that the self is a complex structure of 
interacting drives. However, Anderson’s notion of emergence is underdeveloped and 
misguided. After exploring Anderson’s account, my objections to it will lay the 
foundations for a new account of Nietzschean selfhood. 
Anderson aims to offer a conception of Nietzschean selfhood that is neither 
transcendentalist nor naturalistically reductionist. The transcendental approach can 
account for self-creation and the like, but there is little evidence for such a reading. 
Anderson accuses Gardner’s argument of being “based primarily on an a priori 
argument identifying alleged presuppositions of Nietzschean positions, rather than 
any direct argument from Nietzsche’s texts” (Anderson, 2012: p206). There is a 
wealth of evidence for a reductionist or eliminativist account. However, these 
approaches struggle to capture self-creation and also have their textual counter-
evidence. Through his arguments against these types of account, Anderson draws out 
the kind of self that he is looking for. 
 
a) Non-transcendental or metaphysical: The Nietzschean self is not a 
unified, identical entity existing as either a logical function or real 
substance. 
b) Not eliminated: Nietzsche endorses some kind of self. 
c) Non-reductionist: The Nietzschean self is both complex and not 
reducible to constituent parts. (Anderson, 2012: p.211-216) 
 
Anderson suggests that “Nietzsche’s agenda is to change our conception of the soul, 
not to get rid of it as an identifiable object of psychology over and above its 
subpersonal constituents” (Anderson, 2012: p.215). He then provides an account of 
drives and affects. There are a four key ideas. Firstly, drives and affects exist in 
functional relationships with each other. Due to differing, but mutually beneficial 
natures, they use each other. Drives use affects to achieve their goals in different 
ways. Affects use drives to provide more “telic shape” to habitual actions (Anderson, 
2012: p.221). Secondly, this functional relationship means that drives and affects 
should not be understood as disconnected entities that occasionally, randomly 
interact. Specific drives and affects are bound to each other and to a given individual 
in virtue of the fact that they can recruit each other only because they exist within that 
individual. Thirdly, drives and affects can combine in certain ways to create more 
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complex drives or structures. Finally, when this happens, the more complex structure 
is a distinct psychological object, over and above its constituents. This is key for 
Anderson. He uses an example from Richardson (1996: p.47). We may have a “‘social 
eating’ drive” (Anderson, 2012: p.13). This arises from our drives to eat and socialise, 
presumably with accompanying affects, and it is a distinct drive (Anderson, 2012: 
p.217-223). Anderson then suggests the following. 
 
“There is a still looser whole into which the standing drives and affects 
organize themselves for the purposes of recruiting one another to secure 
their contents and complements. This larger, looser structure is the 
minimal self, a functional grouping of drives and affects that permits such 
mutual recruitability.” (Anderson, 2012: p.226) 
 
Anderson understands the Nietzschean self as a psychological object distinct from its 
constituent drives. 
 
“It makes sense to treat each of the things contributing to the self - i.e. 
each drive, affect, higher-order attitude, etc., up to and including the self 
as a whole - as a psychological object in its own right, even though they 
all stand in relations of mutual dependence. The minimal self is but one 
psychological structure among the others. It acquires the right to the name 
‘self’ simply in virtue of being the emergent structure that encompasses 
all of the substructures available for recruitment by one another.” 
(Anderson, 2012: p.226-7) 
 
So Anderson finds his desired Nietzschean self. The self is not eliminated, everyone 
has a minimal self. The self cannot be reduced to one drive or set of drives. It is over 
and above the drives and affects it emerges from. Lastly, there is no transcendental 
or metaphysical understanding of the self. There are two points in need of 
clarification. 
Anderson never explains what he means by “over and above”. The term seems to 
be built into his theory in order to provide the self with certain capabilities. However, 
it needs to be applicable to other psychological structures. If the ‘social eating drive’ 
is not over and above its constituents then we will struggle to see how the self can be 
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so because the self is simply the highest structure formed by our psychological 
components. “Over” appears to refer to the idea that the ‘social eating drive’ is 
irreducible to the drives to eat and socialise. It is “over” these drives in that it is 
distinct from these drives. “Above” appears to capture the idea that the ‘social eating 
drive’ is more complex than its constituents. If the ‘social eating drive’ is distinct 
from and irreducible to the drives to eat and socialise then we can see how it can 
interact with these drives in its own right. The minimal self is “over and above” in 
just the same way. It is “over” in that it is distinct from any one of its constituents and 
can thereby enter into relations with its various constituents. It is “above” in that it is 
the most complex psychological object within an individual. 
We also need a better grasp on the minimal self. Anderson claims that drives 
“coalesce…into…structures around particular intentions and patterns of action” 
(Anderson, 2012: p.226). The ‘social eating drive’ forms itself around the act of social 
eating. The highest structure that the drives organise themselves into apparently has 
the purpose of “mutual recruitability” (Anderson, 2012: p.226). The minimal self is 
a structure that forms itself around the intention and action of recruitment of all lower-
level psychological structures. A problem that will return later is that Anderson 
provides two examples of complex psychological structures, the self and the ‘social 
eating drive’. The self is not “fundamentally different in kind from the attitudes that 
compose it” (Anderson, 2012: p.225). However, the ‘social eating drive’ is a drive 
whereas the self is not. Much of Anderson’s motivation for his account of selfhood is 
a resistance to understanding the self as a dominant drive (Anderson, 2012: p.214-
216). The problem is not that we can make no sense of the existence of a Nietzschean 
psychological structure that is not a drive. Rather, drives are Nietzsche’s explanatory 
device for thought and action. Anderson claims that the self is a distinct structure that 
can perform actions, primarily recruitment, but that it is not a drive. Such structures 
appear to be missing in Nietzsche’s work. Our behaviour is explained in terms of 
drives. Anderson correctly notes that such explanations can be complex. A given 
action might be explained by the interaction between various drives and affects. We 
might be able to posit the existence of drives with ever increasing complexity. 
However, that something else emerges from this interplay that is not itself a drive, 
but plays an explanatory role in action may be a step too far without a better grasp on 
what this emergent structure is. Unfortunately, Anderson does not give us a clearer 
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idea of what he has in mind. Instead, the self is posited as a structure that just can 
perform certain actions. 
Leaving this problem for now, we can answer questions (1) and (2) above. 
 
1) Anderson’s Self: The highest level of psychological structure that 
forms in order to facilitate and carry out the mutual recruitability of 
lower-level structures. 
2) It is called the self in virtue of being the most complex psychological 
structure that encompasses all other structures. 
 
Anderson’s main aim with regards to Nietzsche’s practical philosophy is to find a self 
that might self-create, self-master, and so on. Being “over and above” its constituents, 
Anderson suggests that the self “can suffer from a ‘gap’ between its own activity and 
that of some constituent(s)” (Anderson, 2012: p.227). Just because a certain drive can 
be recruited by the self, it does not follow that the self will successfully recruit it. In 
such a case, the self will evaluate the recalcitrant drive negatively. By understanding 
the self as a distinct psychological object, Anderson attributes to it “the capacity to 
take up attitudes…towards the world and also towards itself and its drives and affects” 
(Anderson, 2012: p.228). Importantly, the self is a psychological object that has this 
capacity.  
Anderson notes that the minimal self does not fulfil Nietzsche’s ideal of a self that 
can self-create. Just because I negatively evaluate the expression of a drive, I do not 
thereby alter this expression. Anderson introduces the notion of a “normative self” 
(Anderson, 2012: p.231). This self “is just a more unified, more harmoniously 
ordered, more internally disciplined and effective ‘social structure’” (Anderson, 
2012: p.231). A minimal self is capable of reflecting on itself. However, such 
reflection does not entail self-control. The normative self can control its constituents 
as it desires. As we will see later, Nietzsche has various criteria for being considered 
an ideal or free self. One must control oneself in the right way, but self-control could 
be the starting point of attainting freedom and becoming ideal. Anderson notes that 
the normative self is not a fundamentally different kind of self. It is a well ordered 
minimal self capable of controlling its constituents (Anderson, 2012: p.231). The 




Anderson is relatively mute about how one may be capable of self-control. A 
necessary, but not sufficient capability is that of critical self-reflection. His idea seems 
to be that it depends on an individual’s specific psychological structure. Some of us 
will have certain drives and affects from which a self capable of self-control can 
emerge. The issue of whether or not we are a normative self is an empirical matter 
(Anderson, 2012: p.231). We can know if someone is an example of a normative self 
by examining their life. We now have a brief answer to (3). 
 
3) The possibility of self-control is the foundation of Nietzsche’s 
practical philosophy. The normative self has the ability to self-control 
because it is strong enough to realise its self-evaluation in action. 
 
5.2 Rejecting Emergence 
Despite his insights, Anderson’s account of the minimal self as an emergent object is 
misguided and unnecessary for explaining Nietzsche’s practical philosophy.  
Anderson is aware of Nietzsche’s view that everything is in perpetual flux (GS: 
111. TSZ: Blissful Islands). 
 
“The ‘boundaries’ of the minimal self are porous in principle; there is 
nothing to prevent my forming and acquiring new drives and affects, nor 
driving some of the ones I have out of existence.” (Anderson, 2012: 
p.224) 
 
This idea is problematic for Anderson’s own theory. The self is an emergent object 
that allows for the mutual recruitability of the structures from which it has emerged. 
Take a self, S, that emerges from drives A, B and C. S is an object that allows for the 
mutual recruitability of these drives. Suppose C becomes weak through lack of 
gratification and that C is inimical to A’s gratification. Eventually A forces C out of 
the psychological manifold. S is no longer an object that allows for the mutual 
recruitability of A, B and C because C is not there. S is an object that allows for the 
mutual recruitability of A and B. We need to know what happens here in terms of 
emergence. 
The first option is that S disappears and S2 emerges from A and B. If the self 
emerges from lower-level structures, whenever those structures change, a new self 
44 
 
emerges. This might make problematic any notion of self-creation and the like. As 
soon as one self disappeared any achievements would go with it. Furthermore, I may 
struggle to see the point in self-creation if the self I create may disappear at some 
point. Secondly, Anderson would not accept such a view. “The minimal self must 
have its own…identity, which persists across changes of drives and affects” 
(Anderson, 2012: p.224). The question is whether Anderson can support his own 
suggestion. 
The second option is to suggest that S persists in our individual as an object that 
allows for mutual recruitability, but that its possible recruits have changed. S emerged 
from A, B and C, but C was removed. This contradicts another of Anderson’s claims. 
The self is a “looser whole into which the standing drives and affects organize 
themselves” (Anderson, 2012: p.226, emphasis added). This supports the above idea 
that with C out, A and B must re-organise themselves into a new whole. The self is 
not just an object that allows for recruitability. It is an object that allows recruitment 
of the drives from which it emerges. S’s self can no longer emerge from A, B and C 
because C is not part of the structure. 
The third option is to identify the self as the repository of standing drives. 
Anderson claims the self exists “as a repository of recruitable drives or affects” 
(Anderson, 2012: p.223). The self is thereby identical when or because certain drives 
and affects persist. Though the whole repository is in flux, there is a sense in which 
it is identical because of a core group of lower-level structures. Furthermore, it is 
identical because the self just is the repository. My self is my repository regardless of 
what is in that repository. This makes the notion of emergence even murkier. If my 
self is a repository of drives, I don’t appear to be constituted by anything “over and 
above” those drives. Though the repository is distinct from any one of its drives, it is 
not distinct from the sum of those drives. There is no distinct object that emerges as 
anything more complex than the repository taken as a whole. 
Finally, we could claim that a capacity emerges from the fluctuating lower-level 
structures. This might be the capacity for mutual recruitability or self-reflection. The 
latter is not Anderson’s view. He treats the self as a psychological object that has, 
rather than is, the capacity to reflect. Despite Anderson’s focus on objects rather than 
capacities, the former could work as a charitable reading. The self is the capacity for 
mutual recruitability that emerges from the repository of drives and this capacity is 
identical throughout change in that repository. This leads to further objections. 
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Anderson posits a psychologically complex self to account for Nietzsche’s anti-
atomism (BGE: 12). However, his emergentism faces three counts of explanatory 
excess.  The first problem can be explained by examining lower-level structures. The 
‘social eating drive’ emerges from some combination of the drives to eat and 
socialise. This new psychological structure is both complex and distinct from lower-
level drives. It seems that such a structure is complex in that it subsumes the goals of 
lower-level drives. Whilst the social eating drive is distinct from the eating and 
socialising drives, it incorporates them in some specific way. Yet the eating and 
socialising drives still exist as distinct drives. This seems to be an excess of 
explanatory psychology. My desire to have a dinner party can be explained, it seems, 
by reference to active eating and socialising drives momentarily recruiting each other 
along with certain affects. Anderson claims that these drives have formed a new and 
distinct drive with a highly specific goal. This seems to be unnecessary. My objection 
here is not the same as that made by reductionists utilising Williams’ theory (1993). 
That being that belief in the existence of certain psychological capabilities, such as 
self-reflection, can “be explained in terms of the minimal belief/desire apparatus 
or…[are] fabrication[s] of moral consciousness” (Anderson, 2012, p.209). My 
motivation to have a dinner party cannot be explained in terms of basic desires alone. 
Yet it can be explained by appealing to certain drives, affects and the complex 
relationships between them. Anderson needs to show that my desire for a dinner party 
can only be explained by a specific and complex ‘social eating drive’, but there is no 
obvious or independent motivation for this claim. Applying this to the self, I would 
argue that what the self is can be explained in terms of a complex totality of 
psychological structures. These structures may be relatively simple, but as an 
interrelated whole they make up something complex. The actions, beliefs and desires 
of a self cannot be explained by appealing to minimal structures alone. However, we 
don’t need to posit the existence of some emergent object that multiplies explanatory 
apparatus. 
The next two problems return to the earlier problem. Anderson posits the existence 
of a structure that seems to have the capabilities usually ascribed to drives, but is not 
itself a drive. Whilst this is problematic in itself, it is also unnecessary. Either the 
capacity for mutual recruitability or an object that allows for mutual recruitability is 
said to have the capacity to reflect on its constituents. Drives can evaluate each other. 
They seek to supress and master each other. We don’t seem to need the drives to 
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organise themselves into a structure in order for them to evaluate each other. They 
just need to inhere within the same individual, no matter how disorganised and 
unstructured. Anderson’s view is perhaps supposed to capture the idea that a self can 
evaluate drives in terms of the self’s goals rather than the goals of individual drives. 
This leaves us with the question of what a self’s goals are. Perhaps the goal of the self 
is mutual recruitability. However, the self is not a drive so we don’t need to 
understand its activity as a goal or value. Furthermore, Nietzsche thinks selves can 
have goals and values beyond drive recruitment. These are provided by a self’s active 
and dominating drives. I evaluate a drive as inimical to my values because it opposes 
the value of my dominating drive or drives. It is unclear what Anderson’s account is 
adding here. We don’t need to posit the existence of an emergent object or capacity 
for mutual recruitability to see how deliberation, evaluation and reflection, especially 
at the minimal level, are possible. 
The same problem arises with the self-control of a normative self. We should 
understand this as the activity of dominating drives. If Anderson wants to suggest that 
the normative self can control its drives because the emergent object or capacity has, 
in itself, the capability to control drives then he burdens the self with an unfounded 
capability. He is wary of this, claiming that the normative self “is not anything 
fundamentally different in (psychological) kind from the minimal self…it is just a 
more unified…more internally disciplined and effective ‘social structure’” 
(Anderson, 2012: p.231). So the discipline does come from the ways in which drives 
behave towards each other. A normative self controls itself because its constituent 
drives exist in a harmonious structure that works towards a common goal. We do not 
need the emergence of anything from the lower-level drives. The control is exhibited 
by the harmonious drives themselves. 
Finally, we come to recruitability. Anderson provides arguments for and examples 
of the fact that drives and affects recruit each other. The upshot is that drive 
recruitment is essentially a psychological given for Nietzsche. It seems completely at 
odds with his foundations then for Anderson to claim that the self is a “whole into 
which the standing drives and affects organize themselves for the purposes of 
recruiting one another” (Anderson, 2012: p.226, emphasis added).  
 
“When drives and affects recruit one another, the resulting patterns of 
relations among them…emerge from the interactions of the drives and 
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affects themselves; they are not relations…that would have to be 
established by an explicit or implicit act of ‘synthesis’ on the part of some 
unified agency separate from the drives.” (Anderson, 2012: p224) 
 
Here, drive interaction is, or at least involves, recruitment. The resulting pattern of 
relations that emerges out of the organisation of the self is mutual recruitability. So 
the view seems to be that drives recruit each other in order to recruit each other. This 
emergent ‘whole’ looks completely unnecessary. One could claim that organisation 
does not amount to recruitment. Instead, drives and affects ‘combine’ and ‘organise’ 
themselves into a whole and then they can recruit each other. However, Anderson 
does talk about combination requiring mutual recruitment and says nothing to 
preclude pre-self recruitment (Anderson, 2012: p.221). 
We could suggest that the self exists prior to other forms of recruitment. The 
“interaction of drives and affects, based on mutual recruitability, is a basic and 
incredibly widespread feature” of Nietzsche’s psychology (Anderson, 2012: p.222). 
Perhaps the self exists as a structure allowing for mutual recruitability and then drives 
and affects combine in various ways to generate complex lower-level structures. 
However, Anderson describes mutual recruitability as a “widespread feature”, not the 
capacity or function of an emergent object. Furthermore, we will again struggle with 
emergence on this view. Drives and affects appear to be able to recruit each other in 
virtue of existing within the same individual. At least, that is all that needs to be the 
case. They do not need structure to recruit each other, but recruitment leads to 
structure. 
Finally, we could focus on the idea of mutual recruitability. Drives and affects 
might already recruit each other, but the self allows for mutual, rather than tyrannical 
or accidental, recruitment. We might allow this to be the case in the normative self, 
but it is far too much for a minimal self. A minimal self’s drives and affects recruit 
each other, but not in any kind of mutual harmony. Anderson, aware of this, states 
that the constituents of the minimal self “are not interrelated by their having been 
(actually) recruited by one another, but by their mutual availability for (possible) 
recruitment” (Anderson, 2012: footnote 36). We now have a minimal self that is 
defined simply by the availability of drives for possible recruitment. Again, all that needs 
to be the case for this to happen is for a drive to exist within a psychological manifold. 
No organised structures, emergent objects or emergent capacities are required to see how 
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a drive might get recruited by others. We have seen that there is no clear way of 
understanding Anderson’s use of emergence that coheres with all the other areas of his 
thought. We have now seen that we do not need to posit the existence of emergent objects 
or capacities, over and above the drives, in order to account for complex behaviour, 
evaluative capacities or recruitment capacities. There is no need then to force a coherent 
understanding of emergence out of the limited discussion that Anderson provides.  
The final problem is that there is no concrete textual evidence for Anderson’s view. 
There is evidence that an ideal self can stand back from its psychological structures 
to reflect and act upon them. Anderson, like Gardner, supposes that a self so capable 
must exist as something distinct from these structures. Unlike Gardner, he finds this 
self without a transcendental framework. Anderson’s theory does not explicitly 
contradict much of Nietzsche’s work. However, it is not explicitly supported by any 
text. The only sort of emergence we find in Nietzsche’s work is the emergence of 
ideal or free selves. This is usually mentioned in terms of historical context. At the 
level of individuals, Nietzsche discusses the attainment of freedom, the realisation of 
oneself, and so on. This could be understood as a kind of emergence. However, 
Anderson requires emergence at the minimal level. We will now develop a new 
approach to Nietzschean selfhood which has been hinted at in the objections. 
 
5.3 Nietzsche’s New Self 
Our new account of Nietzschean selfhood will hold onto Anderson’s beneficial 
insights whilst overcoming the objections to his theory. 
I view the Nietzschean self as the complete structure of an individual’s drives, 
affects and the variety of relationships between them. At a minimal level, this 
structure may contain many conflicting drives. At a normative level, this structure 
will be highly organised. However, nothing distinct emerges from this total structure. 
The self simply is the total structure. To quote Anderson: 
 
“The Nietzschean self is...not merely a Humean ‘bundle’ of intrinsically 
unrelated ‘distinct existences’…Nietzsche’s conception of the relations 
between drives and affects forces the posit of a thicker notion of the self, 
existing as a repository of recruitable drives or affects that are always 




Contrary to Anderson, I do not see this repository as emerging from, or being over 
and above, lower-level structures. The self is a bundle, but not “of intrinsically 
unrelated ‘distinct existences’”. This view is reductionist in some ways. The self 
could in theory be picked apart. In HH 106, Nietzsche uses the example of a waterfall 
to dismiss the notion of free will. It could be applied to the self. A waterfall appears 
to us as one part of a river, emerging from some underlying facts. In reality, it is 
nothing more than base materials standing in specific, determined relations to one 
another. It can be reduced to these facts and understood solely in terms of them. 
However, we cannot identify any one of these facts as the waterfall. That reference 
term is reserved for the totality. If anything emerges here, it is nothing but a name9. 
The self is not distinct from or over and above its underlying structures. The self is 
what we call all of these structures taken together within an individual. The self is 
distinct from any one of its parts, but not from the sum of its parts. Anderson uses the 
term “subpersonal” (2012, p.224) and Gardner the “underlying manifold” (2009: p.5) 
to describe certain psychological structures. I take it that these terms denote 
psychological structures existing beneath the level of selfhood. I propose that there 
are no such things as subpersonal structures within a Nietzschean self. Every part of 
our psychological manifold, taken together, constitutes our self. Importantly, as 
Anderson notes, consciousness does not limit the boundaries of the Nietzschean self 
(Anderson, 2012: p.224). The Nietzschean self is not comprised of a ‘person’ and 
‘subperson’. There is simply a ‘subperson’, but being the only structure that 
constitutes our being, it is promoted to ‘person’ or ‘self’. 
This account overcomes the problems with Anderson’s theory. It can easily 
account for psychological change. If the self just is the totality of drives, affects and 
their relations (DAR), when a new drive arises it simply counts as a new part of the 
same self. Secondly, there is no explanatory excess. We can explain an individual’s 
behaviour by appealing to specific parts of their DAR. These specific parts may still 
be complex given that they involve multiple drives, affects and relations. They can 
still be attributed to a self as they are some part of a totality that is specific to a given 
individual. Thirdly, the self is not provided with any special capabilities. The 
capabilities that the self has are conferred by the capabilities that its constituent drives 
                                                 
9 Perhaps a final alternative in understanding Anderson-Emergence. If so, let my work be read as a 
development of Anderson. I maintain that using the philosophically murky concept of emergence is 
not useful or necessary for understanding Nietzschean selfhood. 
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have. As we have seen many times now, there is textual evidence for conceiving of 
the self as nothing more than a DAR, a non-emergent “social structure of the drives 
and emotions” (BGE: 12). 
There might be two minor worries about this self. Perhaps the self should be 
understood as only the portion of the DAR of which we are conscious. To begin, we 
are not conscious of a fixed portion of our DAR and our selves should not be 
understood as simply our dominant drive or drives. Secondly, what we are conscious 
of depends on the concepts by which we are conscious of ourselves and these may 
change overtime or between generations and societies. Thus, this view would face the 
first problem of emergence. We would constantly become different selves. Finally, 
Nietzsche suggests we should understand ourselves through our actions and our 
actions are the expression of drives which we may not always be conscious of. 
Secondly, we can read Nietzsche as suggesting that there are some features of the 
mind other than drives that influence behaviour. Three prominent examples are the 
intellect (D: 109), the memory and the capacity of forgetting (GM: II-1). First, it is 
not established beyond interpretative doubt that these features cannot be reduced to 
certain kinds of drive activity. More importantly, if they cannot be so reduced, we 
need only view them as instrumentally influential. They might be a part of 
Nietzschean selfhood, but the extent to which they are important in action and thought 
depends on how drives use them. It would be a mistake to think that their existence 
would dramatically alter Nietzsche’s conception of selfhood found in BGE 12. We 
must now account for the possibility of self-reflection. 
 
5.4 Self-Reflection 
In order to reflect on ourselves we must observe and know, or try to know, ourselves. 
For Nietzsche, all observation and knowledge is perspectival. 
 
“Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival 
‘knowing’ the only kind of ‘knowing.” (GM: III-12) 
 
Perspectives come from different drives. No kind of self is capable of disinterested 
reflection. If an emergent self is capable of standing back to reflect on itself, it can 
only do this from the perspective of a given, or possibly chosen, drive. At the minimal 
level we do not require a self that is distinct from the psychological manifold in order 
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to be self-reflective. It may not be chosen, but any dominating drive can provide a 
perspective on the self. This seems more problematic at the normative level. 
Nietzsche claims that Sovereign Individuals have the “the capacity to have all the 
arguments for and against at one’s disposal and to suspend or implement them at 
will” (GM: III-12). This seems to be a capacity for choosing drives to provide a 
perspective on the self or the world. I will later argue that Sovereign Individuals are 
not the ideal of Nietzschean selfhood. However, we can avoid simply discarding the 
possibility of controlled reflection. A normative self is constituted by an ordered DAR 
that works in global unity for the benefit of the whole structure, the self. Importantly, 
the will to power is strong and enduring in normative selves. This self is not simply 
the will to power, but it is largely governed it. There are many passages where 
Nietzsche extols the virtues of those in which the will to power dominates and vice 
versa.  
 
“I call an animal, a species, an individual depraved when it loses its 
instincts....I consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, for 
accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking 
there is decline.” (A: 6) 
 
I understand the will to power as a vague drive10. By this I mean that it can be satisfied 
in many ways. In order for the will to power to maximally satisfy itself it seems fair 
to assume that it must utilise a wide variety of drives and affects. In the normative 
self, the will to power seeks to increase the power of the whole self. A condition of 
gaining more power in the perspectivist context is that as many perspectives on life 
as possible are entertained. If the will to power is functioning properly it will utilise 
a number of drives to achieve this. Any utilised drive will serve the will to power. 
The perspective of the utilised drive will be evaluated by the will to power. This does 
not mean the perspective will be obscured. It will simply be evaluated in terms of its 
                                                 
10 The will to power is another highly debated Nietzschean concept. Some think that it is not a drive, 
but a kind of fundamental biological life force, present in all things (Emden, 2016). The debate is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and I must settle for a perhaps simplistic reading. However, even if the 
will to power is such a life force, biological or otherwise, we see in the quote from The Anti-Christ 
that life can lack it. Thus, the normative self is one in which the will to power is strong enough to 
organise the drives into a harmonious structure, thereby benefitting the power of the individual. See 
Clark (1990: p.227) for the will to power as a drive. See Soll (2012: p.119-121) for the will to power 
as a largely psychological thesis. 
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ability to increase the power of the individual. Secondly, the will to power is not 
exempt from reflection. When a drive is utilised it provides a perspective on the whole 
structure. Thus, a ‘standing back’ is possible. The normative self can reflect on itself 
as a whole by means of the will to power utilising different drives which provide 
specific perspectives on the world and the self.  
With this apparatus in place, it is time to consider our second inconsistency. 
 
“If a person’s life trajectories are determined in advance by the natural 
facts about himself, then how can a person really create himself?” (Leiter, 
2001: p.289) 
 
We have now fully motivated this paradox. We have seen that drives are fully 
responsible for who we are and how we behave. There is nothing that amounts to 
selfhood beyond all our “natural facts”11 taken together and we have no capacity to 
alter these facts that does not amount to drive interaction. Despite this, we can 
overcome the paradox. We will see how by an exploration and rejection of Leiter’s 
solution. We will then overcome Gardner’s worries about valuing and subjectivity. 
 
6 - Re-Locating the Self 
 
6.1 The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation 
Leiter claims that “there is, as it were, no ‘self’ in ‘self-mastery’” (Leiter, 2009: p.125. 
2001: p.318). He qualifies this by saying: “that is, no conscious ‘self’ who contributes 
anything to the process. ‘Self-mastery’ is merely an effect of the interplay of certain 
unconscious drives” (Leiter, 2009: p.125. 2001: p.318). This conscious self is what I 
identify as an X. It provides us with the capacity to suspend the influence of drives. 
Leiter could be claiming either that Nietzsche thought an X exists as an 
epiphenomenal entity or that Nietzsche rejects the existence of an X. We have seen 
that we should endorse the latter. We have also seen that Nietzsche still endorses the 
existence of a self, as a DAR, that can be conscious of drive deliberation. There are 
two objections to Leiter’s solution to the paradox. 
                                                 
11 We are remaining agnostic about just how ‘natural’ these facts are. 
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Leiter’s solution is to claim that we need to understand self-creation as being 
devoid of any self or at least conscious self. 
 
“Our paradox is resolved by understanding fatalism to be the dominant 
theme in Nietzsche’s work, while his talk of ‘creating’ the self is merely 
the employment of a familiar term in an unfamiliar sense, one that 
actually presupposes the truth of fatalism.” (2001: p.319) 
 
The view seems to be that when Nietzsche speaks of self-creation he is really 
speaking of something like creation-of-the-self. The ‘self’ is created by unconscious 
drives. For Leiter, the self plays no causal role in willing or acting (Leiter, 2009: 
p.125). This is not a satisfactory solution to the paradox. The paradox arises because 
Nietzsche eliminates certain conceptions of selfhood and endorses a drive-based 
fatalism. This stands in contrast with his ideal of self-creation. Leiter’s solution 
doesn’t properly tackle the language and ideas Nietzsche uses in his practical 
philosophy. Free individuals are not simply created, they create. My own solution is 
similar to Leiter’s. Taking ‘self-creation’, I argue that Nietzsche redefines the ‘self’. 
Leiter argues that ‘self-creation’ is redefined so that the ‘self’ doesn’t actually create. 
Something needs to be said for my chosen redefinition. 
Leiter’s account of Nietzschean selfhood is focused on the theoretical work rife 
with eliminativism and epiphenomenalism. The deeper problem with Leiter’s 
solution is that it misunderstands Nietzsche’s practical project. This project is a 
radical overcoming of the elimination of the concepts that we hold so dear. This 
amounts to a re-conceiving of those very concepts. In BGE 12 the soul as it has 
traditionally been conceived is eliminated, “but the road to new forms and 
refinements of the soul-hypothesis stands open”. In BGE 21, free will, as traditionally 
conceived, is eliminated, as well as the unfree will. The very idea of willing is not 
thereby eliminated. Following from this, despite Nietzsche’s rejection of moral 
responsibility, he rebukes those that think they can shirk any kind of responsibility 
for themselves. We have to find Nietzsche’s refinements of these concepts and how 
he uses them. Leiter seems overly content to stop at the eliminative stage. 
Leiter presents Nietzsche in a way that allows one to overstate the similarity 
between Hume and the German. My account of Nietzschean selfhood is essentially a 
bundle theory of the self. Leiter presents a bundle theory of personhood. Though what 
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exactly we are a bundle of differs between Nietzsche and Hume12, the key difference 
comes in the practical sphere. 
Hume speaks of the melancholy that philosophical reasoning places him in for 
various reasons. However: 
 
“Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling 
these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this 
philosophical melancholy…, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by 
some avocation…I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and 
am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours of 
amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and 
strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them 
any farther.” (Treatise: I-IV-VII) 
 
Hume abandons his reflections, or is alleviated by nature, whereas Nietzsche embeds 
his theoretical thought within his practical philosophy so as to overcome it. He 
subsumes his reflection by a total reckoning with it. One cannot self-create, and see 
oneself as self-creating, because one forgets that the self has been eliminated in favour 
of a bundle of drives. One can only see oneself as creator when one acknowledges 
that this bundle of drives just is what one is. 
The problem with Leiter’s idea that one does not create, but is created, is that it 
amounts to the flight from responsibility that Nietzsche wants to avoid. It leads to the 
view that one is inert and must just wait to see how one turns out. There is much that 
is right about Leiter’s analysis. In one sense, we are simply created. However, this is 
only the case from a perspective that holds onto the idea of some kind of agent-X, 
albeit a causally inert one. Leiter misses Nietzsche’s final step. When or if one can 
acknowledge one’s DAR as nothing less than oneself then the world of selfhood, 
willing and responsibility is revived. This is why it is preferable to read Nietzsche as 
reconceiving of the self and then fully endorsing self-creation as a creative act of the 
self. It not only enables us to make more sense of his practical language, but captures 
the full extent of his practical philosophy. 
 
                                                 
12 Hume has it that we are a bundle of perceptions (Treatise: I-IV-VI). 
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6.2 Subjective Valuing 
Gardner has the following problem with Nietzsche’s theoretical philosophy applied 
to the practical sphere. 
 
“The Nietzschean subject lacks any rational warrant for regarding his 
valuation as anything more than the expression of a natural force; and this 
notion - that one could take one's values, not just when viewing oneself 
sideways on but also in the very act of legislating and endorsing them, to 
be nothing more than the causal effects of pre‐normative psychological 
forces - encounters a problem of sheer inconceivability for subjects in 
whom the taste for justification is well established.” (Gardner, 2009: 
p.16) 
 
This challenges my account of the Nietzschean self, suggested to be a repository of 
“pre-normative psychological forces”. We can overcome this challenge. First, there 
is no such thing as a “pre-normative” drive. Quite the opposite, drives bring with them 
their values and norms as the ends to which they strive. When we are in the grip of 
the drive to cruelty, we normatively legislate cruelty as a goal towards which we 
strive. Nevertheless, Gardner has two valid questions. 
 
1) How can we justify some values over others? 
2) How do we understand acts of valuing and justification in a subjective 
way? 
 
There are two answers to (1). We can or should justify the values that come from our 
drives. We should reject the values that are provided by socialised herd mentality. 
Secondly, we can or should justify the values of drives that facilitate our power and 
reject those that diminish our power. Thus, we can distinguish between the values 
that come from our own drives. Some of these drives may be acquired overtime or 
become socially perverted. If they negatively influence our ability to gain power then 
we should reject their values or suitably redirect their expression. We might now ask 
why we should accept the values that increase our power. Accepting these self-
serving values is the only way to escape nihilism. This will be explored later. We turn 
now to question (2). 
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The problem of self-alienation arises for Gardner if we must accept that our values 
come from an uncontrollable psychological structure. This removes any sense of an 
‘I’ behind our values. The self, understood as a DAR (total structure of drives, affects 
and their relations), appears only as an object and cannot capture subjectivity. This 
misunderstands Nietzsche’s radical philosophy and the idea of achieved selfhood or 
subjectivity.  
Hume is happy to be removed from his theoretical reflection. Leiter fails to follow 
Nietzsche’s practical reckoning with his theoretical work. Leiter thereby fails to 
capture subjectivity. Gardner cannot see how Nietzschean theory can be embedded 
in a practical philosophy. Hume is a manifestation of the tension that Gardner 
highlights. His reflection is opposed to what he needs to believe about himself in the 
practical sphere and he cannot overcome this. However, for Nietzsche, one achieves 
subjectivity when one accepts that one is nothing but a DAR. 
Take conscious deliberation. Note that Nietzsche would say those with a taste for 
justification are governed by some drive to justification or knowledge. So there is a 
higher-level tension as one must also take the desire for justification to be the 
expression of a drive. Nietzsche tells us that conscious deliberation is conceptual 
awareness of drive interplay. Gardner is worried about the following self-conception. 
My conscious deliberation is just conceptual awareness of the interplay of my drives. 
The implications of this self-conception are, again, that we are an ‘I’ that has 
subpersonal drives. The further implication is that the ‘I’ is alienated from other parts 
of the person because it has no power over them. Nietzsche rejects this distinction. 
The ‘I’ just is those drives, whether they are conscious or not. If one comes to perceive 
oneself as nothing more than a DAR then a change occurs. One takes oneself to be 
deliberating simply because one is deliberating. That is, one’s conscious deliberation, 
consciousness of deliberation, is seen as an expression of oneself. Gardner falsely 
characterises the problem by claiming that when justifying values one must take one’s 
values as “nothing more” than the expression of drives. When we achieve the correct 
self-conception our values are an expression of ourselves and this is precisely what 
justifies those values. When one gains a Nietzschean self-conception one takes 
oneself to be the thing that values, deliberates and acts. 
Secondly, the self is distinct from any one part of the DAR, but not from the sum 
of those parts. When a potential value is provided by a specific drive it is evaluated 
in terms of its utility for increasing the power of the individual as a whole. The 
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statement, ‘I value P’, can be picked apart as follows. P is valued by drive Z. I am a 
DAR. DAR is inclined by Z to value P. P is valuable to my DAR. Therefore, I value 
P. P is subjectively accepted or chosen as a value. There is an ‘I’ utilising a drive and 
choosing a value, but this ‘I’ is a DAR. 
Finally, we can examine our self-referential language. Alienation is a problem 
when we think: ‘My values are provided by my DAR’. This statement assumes that 
the DAR is owned by some ‘I’. Nietzsche makes the DAR the referent of this ‘I’. We 
can restate the above as: ‘DAR’s values are provided by DAR’s DAR’. Once the 
DAR is accepted as the self we can go further: ‘My values are provided by my-self’. 
This may just be a trick of language. However, Nietzsche views the traditional 
conception of selfhood as just such a trick (BGE: 16). That trick created the illusion 
of some distinct self, over and above the body (drives). Nietzsche’s trick strongly 
affirms that the self is no more than the body. “The enlightened man says: I am body 
entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body” (TSZ: 
Despisers of the Body). 
 
6.3 The Paradox Properly Resolved 
Fatalism holds that our life trajectory is ‘fixed’ by the drives that constitute our self. 
There is scope here. One with a strong drive to truth may become a priest, scientist, 
philosopher, and so on. It will depend on social and historical context as to how these 
drives express themselves. Self-creation is possible when the values that we follow 
come from the free expression of our drives. We will elucidate this idea in the next 
section. Leiter’s paradox is resolved in two ways. Firstly, it can be oneself, as opposed 
to society, that creates one’s values. Secondly, we can take ourselves to be the creative 
force behind our lives when we achieve Nietzschean subjectivity. Of course, it is 
down to the drives as to whether or not Nietzsche’s concept of a self is internalised. 
Our penultimate task is to see how Nietzsche develops his own compatibilism. We 
will see that self-creation amounts to a kind of freedom and that there is still a higher 






7 - Nietzsche’s Free Self 
 
7.1 The Sovereign Individual 
In GM II-2, Nietzsche introduces the Sovereign Individual (SI). The SI is purported 
to have free will. As such, it is common for scholars to take the SI as representative 
of Nietzschean freedom. We will see that this is a mistake and then develop the correct 
understanding of Nietzschean freedom. 
 
“The sovereign individual…the man with his own independent, enduring 
will, the man who is entitled to make promises. And in him we find a 
proud consciousness…of what has finally been achieved here, of what 
has become incarnate in him - a special consciousness of power and 
freedom, a feeling of the ultimate completion of man. This liberated man, 
who is really entitled to make promises, this master of free will.” (GM: 
II-2). 
 
The key characteristic of the SI is their entitlement to make promises. They are so 
entitled because they are free to determine their own action. Only an SI is strong and 
free enough to resist internal and external obstacles to fulfil a promise. The idea then 
is that Nietzsche views traditional free will as illusory only because we don’t all have 
it. When we achieve it, we become an SI. Acampora (2004) and Loeb (2005) have 
convincingly suggested that the SI is not representative of Nietzschean freedom. 
Starting with the simplest of Acampora’s arguments, SIs are mentioned almost 
solely in GM (Acampora, 2004: p.152-3). If Nietzsche considered the attainment of 
free will such that one can make promises as his greatest ideal, he would appear to 
have paid little attention to it. 
Secondly, Acampora notes Nietzsche’s preoccupation with becoming. Who we are 
is not fixed. This does not contradict fatalism. The idea is that, within certain 
parameters, we are constantly changing. Different drives wax and wane, we re-create 
ourselves in different ways, and so on. The desire to be a fixed subject, to be able to 
stand security for some future action, would appear to contradict this. Furthermore, 
the possibility of being able to ensure a future action seems to be questioned by 
Nietzsche. Whether it is from self-creation or not, we are in a state of constant flux 
with drives continually growing and fading (Acampora, 2004: p.153). 
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These objections open the possibility of further inconsistency. However, close 
attention to the SI blocks this thought. The SI is the result of an “enormous process” 
that aims to make humans responsible for their actions (GM: II-2). In order to do this, 
humanity undertakes “the task of breeding an animal which is entitled to make 
promises” (GM: II-2). This task “presupposes as its condition a more immediate task, 
that of first making man…necessary, uniform…regular and consequently calculable” 
and “it was by the means of the morality of custom and the social straight-jacket that 
man was really made calculable” (GM: II-2). The SI is the end product of the morality 
of custom and social constraint. Nietzsche does not think highly of this morality of 
custom. Its goal is to make humans autonomous to the extent that they can be held 
morally responsible for their actions and accordingly rewarded or punished. “Modern 
conceptions of the individual as autonomous have been crafted in order to press them 
into the service of moral accountability and retribution” (Acampora, 2004: p.151). 
This conception of autonomy originates in the slave morality that inverts master 
morality. The “downtrodden” achieve the heights of this inversion by asserting that 
“the strong may freely choose to be weak, and the bird of prey to be lamb - so they 
win the right to blame the bird of prey for simply being a bird of prey” (GM: I-13). 
The purpose of the morality of custom is to assert that one, disconnected from one’s 
actual nature, can choose who to be and what to do. The success of this process and 
its products, such as the SI, is not an ideal state of affairs for Nietzsche. 
Next, Nietzsche never claims that the SI has free will. What we find is a 
consciousness or feeling of free will. As consciousness is simply conceptual 
awareness, this amounts to an interpretation of certain psychological facts. The above 
analysis highlights that this interpretation has social origins. The SI ‘knows’ that it 
has free will because a social concept is used to fix a feeling arising from underlying 
facts. However, the SI has “broken away from the morality of custom”, they are a 
“supra-moral individual”. The SI no longer needs the guidance of social custom to 
act morally. This is the height of Kantian moral autonomy, the idea that the moral law 
comes from within. One can deduce the moral law “from the universal concept of a 
rational being as such” (G: 4-412). What the SI forgets is that these laws are simply 
the laws of society. Society forces the animal to see itself as a rational being and that 
there are certain laws that bind such beings. SIs really believe this. They assume 
responsibility for their moral actions, but the actions they consider moral are those 
that society has decided are moral. Finally, the SI is an achieved product. It is a 
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contemporary phenomenon that stands at the end of a long history. Nietzsche’s 
project is an overcoming of our contemporary situation (Acampora, 2004: p.156-7). 
Nietzsche posits a future beyond the SI. Through a careful support of the scholarly 
rewards we gain by giving Thus Spoke Zarathustra (TSZ) its proper place in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, Loeb draws our attention to Nietzsche’s philosophy of the 
future (Loeb, 2005: p.71-74). TSZ’s key concept is “the idea of eternal recurrence” 
which Nietzsche claims to be “the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be 
obtained” (EH: Books-TSZ-1). Second, “the concept ‘superman’ [in TSZ] becomes 
the greatest reality - all that has hitherto been called great in man lies at an infinite 
distance beneath it” (EH: Books-TSZ-6). Next, after TSZ, “the affirmative part of 
[Nietzsche’s] task was done”, from then on all his “writings are fish-hooks” for TSZ 
(EH: Books-BGE-1). BGE and GM are destructive books aimed at negatively 
revaluating old ideals (EH: Books-BGE-1). “What was lacking above all was a 
counter-ideal - until the advent of Zarathustra” (EH: Books-GM). Finally, at the end 
of GM II, Nietzsche points to the “man of the future, who will redeem us as much 
from the previous ideal as from what was bound to grow out of it, from the great 
disgust, from the will to nothingness, from nihilism” (GM: II-24). The presentation 
of this future is “something which only Zarathustra is at liberty to do” (GM: II-25). 
‘Zarathustran Freedom’ is meant to overcome ‘Sovereign Freedom’ as a real form of 
freedom. Zarathustran Freedom will be explored shortly, but it should be understood 
as a freedom from nihilism. 
There are signs of Nietzschean freedom in works other than TSZ. The SI is not 
such an example. However, we have seen that Nietzsche valorises self-creation, and 
rejects both the free and unfree will. 
 
7.2 Autonomy 
May (2009) argues that Nietzsche’s ideal freedom is Zarathustran Freedom. 
However, for a self to become free it must meet four conditions: “(a) a maximum 
number of drives, (b) each of them of maximal power, is (c) organized into an 
evolving hierarchy in which (d) one can take satisfaction” (May, 2009: p.90). 
 
(a) Drives provide valuations and perspectives of the world. More drives 
entails more potential perspectives and values. Thus, “one can see and 
create” in more ways (May, 2009: p.93-4). 
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(b) The more power one’s drives have the more potential power one has 
over oneself and the world. However, these drives must work 
together, not against each other (May, 2009: p.93). 
(c) A “hierarchy is a matter of commanding and obeying - of one’s drives 
becoming organised in such a way that one is able to commit oneself 
to projects that matter to one” (May, 2009: p.90). This hints at May’s 
inclusion of promising in Nietzschean freedom, to be examined later. 
May does not conceive of the process of organisation, or self-creation, 
as being guided by any “metaphysical ‘doer’ standing behind its 
‘deed’” (May, 2009: p.92). “Successful hierarchy is…not the result of 
something…called ‘free will’; it is free will” (May, 2009: p.91). 
(d) Self-satisfaction comes through experiencing oneself as free. 
Experiencing oneself as free is constituted by: i) delighting “in seeing 
oneself as a commander”, ii) delighting “in seeing one’s command as 
effective” and iii) not seeking “faith in a dogma that is given or 
collective” (May, 2009: p.91-2). (ii) is explained as delighting in 
“seeing one’s ‘protracted and unbreakable’13 will in action, a delight 
that seems to involve intense awareness of one’s…capacity to commit 
oneself to action” (May, 2009: p.91). 
 
There are a number of problems with these conditions. Firstly, they need some initial 
amendments. Secondly, I will reposition these conditions in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of freedom. Thirdly, this repositioning will lead to further amendments. 
It is difficult to understand the notion of having a maximum number of drives. 
There is no drive checklist. Throughout our lives drives might come and go. Drives 
may also come and go throughout human history. Without an exhaustive list, we 
could suggest a number to designate a maximum. This would be arbitrary and lacking 
in textual support. A more plausible condition would be that May’s self must 
continually incorporate new drives and their perspectives. Rather than a stable 
maximum we have an ongoing activity that seeks a perhaps unattainable maximum. 
Next, we need to finesse the ideas of drives acting with maximum power and 
hierarchical organisation. Consider the guilty Christian. They have a drive to cruelty 
                                                 
13 GM II-2: “The free man [(SI)] - the owner of an enduring, indestructible will”. 
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that expresses itself inwardly. The more powerful this expression, the guiltier the 
Christian feels. This leads to more self-punishment and self-denial. May is aware that 
drive interplay can lead to inner turmoil. The more drives we incorporate and the 
more powerful they are, the more unstable we become (May, 2009: p.94). This is why 
we require hierarchical organisation. However, drives may be hierarchically 
organised such that the drive to cruelty is allowed to vent inwardly and used to supress 
other drives. This might be why May includes the condition of self-satisfaction. The 
Christian is not fully self-satisfied because he is ashamed of his natural instincts. 
However, hierarchical organisation does not necessarily lead to satisfaction. We 
could appeal to the shunning of external dogmas, but not adhering to given dogmas 
does not lead necessarily to a hierarchy that does not deny life or supress drives to 
some extent. May suggests that powerful drives must work harmoniously together. 
This would seem to solve the problem, but it needs clarification. We require a 
hierarchy that serves the power of the individual as a whole14. The evolvablity of this 
hierarchy is key. The power and direction of drive expression must be carefully 
managed to suit different situations. In social situations, my drive to cruelty must be 
managed so that I don’t obviously express it on others. This may mean temporarily 
supressing or redirecting it. When fighting, I must allow this drive its most powerful 
outward expression. I thereby come to gain power over different aspects of the world 
in different ways. 
This is consistent with the idea that Nietzsche urges his readers to: “Become what 
you are!” (TSZ: Honey Offering). May characterises this in terms of finding our own 
purpose in life. Becoming who we are amounts to a discovery of “the organising 
‘idea’” that will govern our lives (EH: Clever-9). So the point here is not that we do 
or should seek total world domination, but that we must find who we are and then we 
can organise ourselves around this idea. It is dangerous to impatiently seek the idea 
too soon. Also of value is exploring multiple avenues. Furthermore, if we are too 
eager to find the idea we risk falsely conceiving of ourselves (May, 2009: p.92). This 
is because such an idea is already growing within us, preparing us in ways unknown 
(EH: Clever-9). This fits with the above in two ways. Firstly, the gaining of power in 
different situations is key for finessing “individual qualities and abilities” (EH: 
Clever-9). By mastering different situations one learns how best to organise oneself 
                                                 
14 Hinted at by May (2009: footnote 16). 
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and prepares one’s drives for the greater task yet to emerge. Secondly, in urging us to 
become who we are, Nietzsche wants us to become those “who are new, unique, 
incomparable, who give themselves laws, [and] create themselves” (GS: 353). We 
will soon see that such self-creation amounts to the expression and acquisition of 
one’s own power. We will also see that the heights of power, power over time, are 
achieved when one affirms life. One does not need to dominate everything, but must 
learn to find what truly satisfies oneself. This might mean slowly becoming focused 
on one goal. Finally, our organising idea may change, different things may bring us 
satisfaction throughout our lives. We must be careful not to consider ourselves too 
fixed. We can continually become who we are. Nietzsche himself one day became a 
professor, another a philologist (EH: Clever-9). 
This leads to our repositioning of May’s conditions in Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
freedom. May posits these conditions as necessary for achieving Zarathustran 
Freedom and I agree. Zarathustran Freedom involves the ultimate liberation of the 
will. However, I believe there is a lower-level freedom, Nietzschean autonomy, which 
is achieved by May’s initial conditions. May ambiguously refers to autonomy in two 
places (May, 2009: p.90, p.94). He suggests that his conditions define “the maximally 
free, autonomous self” (May, 2009: p.94). However, May holds that the constitution 
of self characterised by (a) - (d) is “the first condition…for freedom” and not enough 
to be maximally free (May, 2009: p.90). Secondly, May does not appear to want to 
establish a lower-level freedom. If he does, then let the following be further support 
and finessing of his view. Nietzschean autonomy is characterised by the ability to live 
by one’s own values. 
 
“One can dispose of one’s drives like a gardener and, though few know it, 
cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and 
profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis…All this we are at liberty to do: 
but how many know we are at liberty to do it? Do the majority not believe in 
themselves as in complete fully-developed facts?” (D: 560) 
 
“Do you call yourself free? I want to hear your ruling idea, and not that 
you have escaped from a yoke. 
… 
Free from what?...Your eye should clearly tell me: free for what? 
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Can you furnish yourself with your own good and evil and hang up 
your own will above yourself?” (TSZ: Way of the Creator) 
 
Freedom here is not Zarathustran Freedom, notwithstanding one quote from TSZ. It 
is a freedom that is characterised by one’s ability to self-create. We have seen that 
such self-creation is compatible with fatalism. One self-creates when one’s values 
and changing trajectory are an expression of one’s own drives. We will now develop 
this notion. 
Nietzsche equates morality with tradition and suggests that “the free human being 
is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and not 
upon tradition” (D: 9). Freedom from the yoke of tradition is important, but Nietzsche 
has a nuanced take on what this amounts to. Remembering the link between freedom 
and immorality, Nietzsche notes that “if an action is performed not because tradition 
commands it but for other motives (because of its usefulness to the individual, for 
example),…it is called immoral” (D: 9). Tradition is “a higher authority which one 
obeys, not because it commands what is useful to us, but because it commands” (D: 
9). This presents the first element of Nietzschean autonomy. Autonomy is living by 
values that one chooses oneself because of their “usefulness” to oneself. Those that 
create new values exercise Nietzschean autonomy. However, D 9 shows that 
autonomy does not necessarily require the creation of new values, but the following 
of values that are useful to oneself. This might mean following existing values. Our 
next task is to understand what Nietzsche means by “usefulness”. 
It is instructive to begin by looking at what is useful for a society. We will soon 
see that the means by which a society creates and evaluates values is the same means 
by which the individual does so. Additionally, we have seen that an individual is a 
social structure of drives. Values useful to a society are those that facilitate its 
thriving. Every society has different requirements. “If [a society] wishes to maintain 
itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates. Much that seemed good to one 
people seemed shame and disgrace to another” (TSZ: Thousand and One Goals). 
Next we learn that “whatever causes [a society] to rule and conquer and glitter, to the 
dread and envy of its neighbour, that it accounts…the evaluation and the meaning of 




“A table of values hangs over every people. Behold, it is a table of its 
overcomings; behold, it is the voice of its will to power.” (TSZ: Goals) 
 
Above we saw that free individuals hang their own will above themselves. We should 
now see that this means such individuals create and evaluate according to their own 
will to power. By expressing one’s own will to power one follows values that are 
useful to one’s thriving. As with neighbouring societies, such expression will lead to 
differing values between different individuals. We cannot say which values are going 
to be useful for each of us. However, in order to live by values which are useful to 
ourselves, the creation and evaluation of values must be governed by our own will to 
power. We thereby create ourselves and our own trajectories. The will to power is a 
will to mastery. 
 
“Where I found a living creature, there I found will to power; and even in 
the will of the servant I found the will to be master. 
The will of the weaker persuades it to serve the stronger; its will wants 
to be master over those weaker still… 
And where sacrifice and service and loving glances are, there too is 
will to be master.” (TSZ: Self-Overcoming) 
 
This will is incredibly broad in scope. “It will want to grow, expand, draw to itself, 
[and] gain ascendancy” (BGE: 259). We will see later that this broadness means that 
Nietzschean autonomy is necessary, but not sufficient for Zarathustran Freedom. For 
now, we have arrived at our understanding of Nietzschean autonomy. One is 
autonomous to the extent that one’s values are an expression of one’s own drives 
governed by one’s will to power. 
This leads to further amendments to May’s conditions, now understood as an 
achievement of autonomy. Firstly, the idea of having or trying to attain a maximum 
number of drives seems redundant. One can be autonomous regardless of one’s drive 
tally. All that is required is that drive expression serves one’s will to power. 
Hierarchical organisation must be retained. Only in an evolving hierarchy can drives 
effectively serve the power of the individual. Condition (a) is slightly misplaced. 
Nietzsche speaks of philosophers being able “to see the greatness of man, the concept 
‘greatness’…in his wholeness in diversity: [the philosopher] would even determine 
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value and rank according to how much and how many things one could endure and 
take upon oneself” (BGE: 212). Greatness is determined by how many drives “one 
can see and create” with (May, 2009: p.94). Whilst greatness may require freedom, 
freedom does not require greatness. An individual constituted by the drive to cruelty 
alone may be free, but not great because they can only take one perspective on the 
world. 
Finally, self-satisfaction is not needed to be considered autonomous. One does not 
even need to know that one is autonomous to be autonomous. There is no textual 
evidence that would contradict this idea and no independent reasons for why this 
could not be the case. One is autonomous to the extent that one’s values serve one’s 
power. As this amounts to the expression of drives, one may be doing this without 
knowing it. We will see that self-satisfaction is key for Zarathustran Freedom, but it 
need not enter the picture at this stage. 
We can now restate May’s conditions as those that constitute Nietzschean 
autonomy. A self must be comprised of (a2) drives of maximum power, (b2) 
organised into an evolving hierarchy, (c2) that serve the power of the individual. The 
two dropped conditions, (a) and (d), are still important. However, (a) is a condition 
of greatness rather than freedom and (d) will return with Zarathustran Freedom. 
The above attributes to Nietzsche a subversive, revisionary account of freedom as 
autonomy. Nietzschean autonomy amounts to the expression and acquisition of 
power, by and through the drives. As the Nietzschean self is nothing more or less than 
the totality of one’s drives, we can see that this expression is a kind of self-
governance. However, on various interpretations of the term, this kind of self-
governance is not sufficient for exhibiting autonomy. Nietzsche denies the existence 
of an agent, distinct from the drives, that might cause, influence, authorise or condone 
behaviour. We need to ask how and why Nietzsche can revise our concept of freedom 
to such an unrecognisable degree. 
Here it will be useful to briefly note Richardson’s account of Nietzschean freedom. 
Richardson suggests that Nietzsche understands freedom as “an evolving ability with 
an idea of itself” (Richardson, 2009: p.131). This capacity evolves with a mutable 
idea of itself, “an idea of what is being done, of what this freedom is it’s achieving” 
(Richardson, 2009: p.130). Nietzsche’s negative treatment of freedom is aimed at its 
present manifestation. His positive project is to “redesign” freedom into something 
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“appropriate for us today” (Richardson, 2009: p.131). Richardson presents three key 
stages in freedom’s history. 
The first stage is drive-freedom. This is constituted by a stable unification of the 
drives such that they effectively express themselves under the rule of a dominating 
drive or drive cluster (Richardson, 2009: p.134-136). Next comes agency-freedom. 
For Richardson, agency is a capacity to restrain our drives developed in us by society 
in order to make us subservient (Richardson, 2009: p.136-141). However, agency is 
also a “kind of drive itself” (Richardson, 2009: p.137).  Currently, agency makes us 
the puppets of society, but Nietzsche aims at a synthesis of agency-freedom and drive-
freedom. In this third stage, a Nietzschean “redesign” adapts our agency to “serve [a] 
new end - which [Nietzsche] thinks is life’s old end - of power” (Richardson, 2009: 
p.131). 
My notion of Nietzschean autonomy is similar to Richardson’s notion of drive-
freedom combined with the positive notion that the free individual aims at their own 
power. Stability and unification should not be taken to describe a self that is a finished 
product with a fixed set of goals. The self is a fluctuating hierarchy of drives and this 
fluctuation is desirable. An autonomous Nietzschean self is stable and unified in the 
sense that drive fluctuation is regulated and evaluated in terms of the power of the 
individual. However, this may involve differing degrees of lower-level disunity and 
instability over time. 
Agency-freedom is supposed to account for the existence and role of 
consciousness. Socially generated concepts have an impact on our lives. Additionally, 
we appear to consciously choose, deliberate and so on (Richardson, 2009: p.136-137). 
I have argued that we can account for these phenomena without positing the existence 
of effective capacities distinct from the drives. Furthermore, Richardson’s 
understanding of agency is confused. It is both a drive and opposed to the drives. If it 
is a drive then agency-freedom is no different to drive-freedom. The evolution story 
crumbles. Freedom is simply drive-freedom, but over time different drives govern the 
self. Nietzsche’s ‘synthesis’ is simply the toppling of agency-rule. However, this is 
not what Richardson sees Nietzsche as trying to do. It is suggested that the agency-
drive could be used in a positive way that serves the individual. There is further 
confusion here. It is suggested that “agency will still constrain drives, but now in their 
own interest: its [role is] to discipline them, and to foster the emergence of a unifying 
passion” (Richardson, 2009: p.148). Drives seek to continually express themselves 
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so constraint is inimical to their interests. It might be within the interests of a group 
of drives, a self, to be suitably constrained at certain times. However, this kind of 
constraint is achieved in drive-freedom and agency is unnecessary. Secondly, we saw 
with May that consciously seeking one’s governing idea is a foolish undertaking that 
risks missing it entirely, yet this is exactly what Richardson seems to claim agency 
should be used for. For these reasons, I do not follow Richardson in the introduction 
or positive application of agency-freedom. Agency as a distinct capacity, unique drive 
or otherwise, is nothing but an erroneous self-conception. This brings us to what is 
useful in Richardson’s account. 
We begin with the mutability of concepts. Whilst I disagree that freedom is an 
evolving capacity, I agree that we have an evolving conception of freedom. 
Nietzsche’s complex genealogies demonstrate that he views concepts as human 
playthings. The idea that ‘autonomy’ or ‘freedom’ must capture certain ideas is 
nonsense to Nietzsche. There is no essence to the concept ‘freedom’. It has a long 
history that we should not consider complete or necessarily reality-tracking. It is a 
concept that has been used to generate certain moral self-conceptions and 
commitments. These self-conceptions are erroneous and the commitments inimical 
to our thriving. Most importantly, the idea that ‘freedom’ must capture, for example, 
drive-distinct agency, is morally loaded. The only reason that ‘freedom’ should 
capture such agency is so that it can support our moralised notions of responsibility. 
As Nietzsche wants to reject these notions, he need not capture what is currently 
implanted into our concept of freedom. We might accept the above, but we should 
then ask why Nietzsche wants to retain the concept of freedom at all. It seems as 
though it would be preferable to abolish it in favour of a philosophy of power. 
Richardson notes an important fact about freedom. We value it to a high degree 
(Richardson, 2009: p.128). We want to view ourselves as free and exercise our 
freedom. Power, on the other hand, is morally dubious. Nietzsche rejects our 
understanding of freedom. Yet this cannot reduce the value that we place on being 
free. In order to engage his reader in his project, Nietzsche offers a new kind of 
freedom. This guards against the incredulous rejection of his work and prevents 
casting his readers into despair at their impotence or joy at their lack of responsibility. 
By revising our understanding of freedom, Nietzsche appeals to our values whilst 
radically subverting them. 
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Additionally, Nietzsche advocates a revaluation of power. The ascetic ideal has 
hypocritically perverted our assessment of power expression such that it is counted 
as evil. For Nietzsche, power expression is the essence of all life. To affirm life we 
must affirm such expression. Nietzsche encourages the reverence of one’s own power 
by suggesting that expressing and seeking power is constitutive of our beloved 
freedom. 
We should now see why Nietzsche retains the concept of freedom as autonomous 
self-governance whilst radically revising it. He demonstrates the mutability of 
concepts and the validity of creatively revising them. Furthermore, he uses the 
concept of freedom to engage his reader whilst initiating a revaluation of freedom and 
power. We now go on to explore Nietzsche’s ideal freedom. 
 
7.3 Zarathustran Freedom 
Zarathustran Freedom is a freedom from nihilism. Nietzschean nihilism is a “will to 
nothingness”. This is a will that affirms that which is beyond our own world and all 
of its aspects (GM: III-28). May highlights three stages of nihilism. 
First, “the will to nothingness affirms the unconditioned - be it called the ‘God’ of 
monotheism, the ‘forms’ of Plato, unconditionally valuable values…or other such 
metaphysical categories” (May, 2009: p.101). The idea is the affirmation of absolute 
truths and values. No such things exist for Nietzsche so to will and affirm them is to 
will what is not there, will nothing (May, 2009: p.101). The second stage is that faith 
in truth begins to undermine our belief in metaphysical absolutes. However, we do 
not thereby shake the ideas that these absolutes introduced into the world. Our morals 
remain unchanged. We still see ourselves as having free will and so on. Most 
importantly, the unconditional value of truth is still maintained (May, 2009: p.101-
2). Finally, our unrelenting faith in truth undermines all of our values including itself. 
This is a more traditional understanding of nihilism. It is the idea that the world is 
without value or meaning (May, 2009: p.102). Nihilism here still affirms that which 
is not reality. It affirms that the world is valueless and meaningless because there are 
no absolute values or meanings. 
There are many ways in which we need to overcome nihilism, but two are 
specifically related to my analysis of selfhood and self-creation. Firstly, one must 
accept that one’s self is nothing more than a DAR. Other conceptions of selfhood 
affirm that which is not there. They both come from and entail other manifestations 
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of nihilism. Secondly, the notion that the world is valueless is an absurdity for 
Nietzsche. As long as we have drives, we have values. Our mistake has been to take 
some values as absolute. When one sees oneself as a DAR, one realises that one can 
create one’s own values to infuse meaning back into existence. 
We now come to the complete freedom from nihilism whereby it gains the name 
Zarathustran Freedom. Ultimate freedom from nihilism is both manifest in and 
attained by joyful affirmation of the doctrine of eternal recurrence (ER). Though TSZ 
is a full exploration of this idea, it first appears in GS. Nietzsche asks us how we 
would feel if a demon told us the following. 
 
“This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once 
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, 
but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything 
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence - even this spider and this moonlight 
between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you 
with it, speck of dust!” (GS: 341) 
 
Nietzsche asks whether such a thought would throw us into despair or fill us with 
immense joy. He then asks: “How well disposed would you have to become to 
yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate confirmation 
and seal?” (GS: 341). To see the power of this thought experiment we must take a 
step back. In TSZ’s Of Redemption we learn that: 
 
“Will - that is what the liberator and bringer of joy is called…now learn 
this as well: The will itself is still a prisoner. 
Willing liberates: but what is it that fastens and fetters even the 
liberator? 
‘It was’: that is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and most lonely 
affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will 
is an angry spectator of all things past. 
The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time’s 
desire - that is the will’s most lonely affliction.” 
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Zarathustra here refers to the will to power. We see the idea that we can self-create 
by exercising our Nietzschean autonomy. Yet our will is still chained by time, it is 
not truly free. In order to be free, the will must not somehow manage to change the 
past. What still binds the will is nihilism. It wills nothingness because it wishes it 
could change the past, change aspects of reality. May characterises time as the last 
object of ressentiment (May, 2009: p.96-7). Unable to change time, “the 
will…becomes malefactor: and upon all that can suffer it takes revenge for its 
inability to go backwards” (TSZ: Redemption). As the will cannot take revenge on 
time itself, it seeks to vent its ressentiment on other objects. Zarathustra goes so far 
as to claim that “this alone is revenge itself: the will’s antipathy towards time” (TSZ: 
Redemption). This final manifestation of nihilism must be overcome. ER gives us the 
tools to achieve this. 
 
“To redeem the past and to transform every ‘It was’ into an ‘I wanted it 
thus!’ - that alone do I call redemption! 
… 
All ‘It was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance - until the creative 
will says to it: ‘But I willed it thus!’ 
Until the creative will says to it: ‘But I will it thus! Thus shall I will 
it!” (TSZ: Redemption, emphasis added) 
 
Zarathustra comes to apprehend the truth of Nietzsche’s demonic statement. Alluding 
to GS, Zarathustra says even “this slow spider that creeps along in the moonlight” 
will return (TSZ: Vision and Riddle). Zarathustra walks with a dwarf, “the Spirit of 
Gravity”, who represents those that call “earth and life heavy” (TSZ: Vision and 
Riddle, Spirit of Gravity). This spirit perhaps represents ourselves and Zarathustra the 
demon itself. For the rest of TSZ III, Zarathustra wrestles with ER until finally coming 
to “lust for eternity…The Ring of Recurrence!” (TSZ: Seven Seals). We should now 
see that affirmation of ER amounts to willing ER. One wills every ‘it was’ not just 
backwards, but forwards. If the willing just went backwards then it would amount to 
acceptance of the past. However, by willing ER one wills a certain future. This future 




Firstly, affirmation of ER amounts to a manifestation of one’s freedom from 
nihilism. We can re-introduce May’s condition (d) here. As I will soon argue, we 
must drop the SI-style language. All we need is a ‘simpler’ self-satisfaction with who 
one is, although one can still delight in seeing oneself as a creator. Free individuals 
create their own values and themselves. However, in order to affirm ER, one must 
lack any form of self-contempt or contempt for life. One does not wish for anything 
past or present to be different so one no longer wills nothingness. Nietzsche asks how 
well disposed to oneself and life you would have to be to affirm ER. The answer is 
clearly: very well disposed. Another of Stern’s epistemological worries is that those 
who posit a particular kind of drive organisation as being Nietzsche’s ideal or concept 
of freedom face the problem of never being able to know when such organisation is 
achieved (Stern, 2015: p.129). ER overcomes this problem. It is only when one’s 
drives are properly organised that one is capable of taking complete satisfaction in 
oneself and in life. To see whether or not anyone is so organised, we ask how they 
feel about ER. A joyful craving of ER demonstrates that they are so organised as to 
be considered ultimately free. Furthermore, such freedom necessarily involves 
Nietzschean autonomy. ER is a test of one’s freedom. 
Affirming ER also attains the affirmer ultimate freedom as it liberates the will from 
the prison of time. One affirms oneself as “a piece of fate” (TI: Errors-8). This means 
affirming one’s place in history, one’s time-boundedness (May, 2009: p.97-8). By 
willing time, and everything in it, to eternally recur, one is no longer “an angry 
spectator of all things past” (TSZ: Redemption). One craves just these things and is 
liberated from their unalterable nature. This leads to the final consequence. Affirming 
ER does not just liberate the will from time, it gains the will power over time. Time 
becomes willed by oneself and is thereby bought under one’s control, if only by a 
certain way of perceiving it. Because one wills the eternal return, it is perceived as 
issuing from oneself. 
This draws out a tension between Nietzschean autonomy and Zarathustran 
Freedom. Zarathustran Freedom amounts to a freedom from nihilism, but also gains 
us mastery over time. In order to master time, one needs to affirm every aspect of life. 
However, we seem to be able to express our will to power in life denying ways. 
Ascetic priests, for example, express their will to power in the creation of nihilistic 
value systems. If the will to power wants mastery over time and if this requires life 
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affirmation, it seems as though the will to power could not express itself through life 
denying values. To the contrary, Nietzsche sees this as a sickness inflicting humanity. 
Feeling imprisoned by time, the will to power “releases itself in a foolish way” 
(TSZ: Redemption). Here we connect with the ideas above. “A great foolishness 
dwells in our will; and that this foolishness acquired spirit has become a curse to all 
human kind. The spirit of revenge:…that, up to now, has been mankind’s chief 
concern” (TSZ: Redemption). The will to power desires power over time, but finds 
no way of gaining it. So instead it expresses itself by seeking mastery over other 
aspects of the world. This amounts to autonomy, but it is not sufficient for 
Zarathustran Freedom. Nietzsche’s examination of Saint Paul demonstrates this. All 
too briefly, Nietzsche sees Paul as inventing Christianity in order to liberate himself 
from the Jewish laws that he knew he could not fulfil. “With the idea of becoming 
one with Christ all shame, all subordination, all bounds are taken from [Paul’s soul], 
and the intractable lust for power reveals itself as an anticipatory revelling in divine 
glories” (D: 68). Paul creates new values and ideals to satisfy his will to power. As 
such, he exhibits Nietzschean autonomy. However, his new ideal is extremely life 
denying. Paul does not wish to live his earthly life eternally, but waits to join Christ 
in heaven. Nietzsche is hyperbolic in his description of Paul’s self-salvation. Paul 
remains bound by nihilism. He cannot affirm the eternal return of the same and as 
such his will to power remains vengeful towards time. 
Gaining mastery over time does not mean subverting or negating it. One gains 
mastery over time by affirming it. One affirms time when one wills ER. In order to 
will ER, one must lack any self-contempt or contempt for life as it is. So in order to 
gain mastery over time, one must live according to values that will facilitate life 
affirmation. Zarathustra attempts to release the will to power from its vengeful 
foolishness. It is not that we should not attempt to change or subvert anything, such 
as existing value systems, but that we should do so in a life affirming manner. 
However, such life affirmation is not a necessary feature of autonomy. 
We now come to the problem of whether or not Nietzsche thought ER was a 
cosmological truth. Loeb thinks he does (2005: p.84), May does not touch on the 
issue. I suggest that, on Nietzsche’s own terms, the cosmological reality of ER is of 
no importance. Firstly, the role ER plays for Nietzsche is indifferent to its truth. 
Affirmation of ER is a manifestation of one’s freedom and gains the will power over 
time. However, these are matters of perception. It is a manifestation of freedom 
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because it demonstrates how well disposed to oneself and to life one is. It gains power 
over time by perceiving time as willed by oneself. Affirming ER does not provide 
one with new abilities, one cannot change time and that is the point. What is important 
for Nietzsche is not the truth of ER, but for the individual to crave it. Secondly, 
affirmation of ER cannot be contingent on its truth. If one need only affirm ER if it is 
true then freedom becomes contingent on the affirmation of a truth and truth retains 
its unconditional value. This leads to a potential problem. If one craves ER and ER is 
not true then it might be another manifestation of nihilism. However, the trick of ER 
is that it affirms everything that has been. It does not affirm that which might be, it is 
a craving for the same to recur eternally. One wills to repeat life exactly as it is. It is 
thereby a manifestation and attainment of freedom whether or not life will actually 
recur. This analysis does not call into question the previous ideas of accepting oneself 
as a DAR and seeing oneself as a value creator. Everything, including truth, has 
conditional value for Nietzsche (Gemes, 2006: p.197). Accepting the reality of drive-
based selfhood has conditional value as it puts one on the path to Zarathustran 
Freedom. Accepting other accounts of selfhood pushes us deeper into nihilism. 
However, Zarathustran Freedom does not rely on the truth or falsity of ER. Even if 
Nietzsche did believe that ER was a cosmological truth, it would not alter the role it 
plays in his philosophy. 
We must now understand what affirmation or willing of ER really amounts to. The 
question Nietzsche wants an answer to in GS is much more serious than anything such 
as: ‘Do you have any regrets?’, ‘Would you change anything?’, or even ‘Would you 
like to live once or twice again?’ The question is: ‘How does the thought of ER make 
you feel?’ It is therefore not enough to simply claim that one wills time or joyfully 
accepts ER. It is also not enough to accept or resign oneself to the truth of ER. May 
notes that we might accept ER by means of some welfare calculus (May, 2009: 
p.103). This too fails to affirm ER. As has been alluded to, affirming ER amounts to 
a joyful craving for ER, regardless of its truth. Furthermore, this must be continual. 
One cannot crave ER just when one has good experiences, one must crave it even 
when one suffers. This is how we come to will ER. We don’t claim “Thus I will it” 
because we should. We master time because the prospect of ER fills us with great joy 
and we then come to will it. 
This brings us to a familiar problem. To become free we need to will the return of 
some terrible events, not just in our lives, but in the lives of all those before us. 
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Affirming ER might be a psychopathically selfish method for achieving freedom 
(Clark, 1990: p.279). Firstly, the affirmation of ER is not something that we should 
do to achieve freedom. It is something that certain individuals might be able to do. If 
we cannot will past terrible events then, unfortunately, we are not free from nihilism. 
Secondly, affirming ER is difficult. It is difficult precisely because most of us cannot 
bring ourselves to will the recurrence of terrible events. To look for an easier way of 
affirming ER, one that sidesteps personal suffering and humanity’s cruel history, 
completely misses Nietzsche’s notion that such affirmation is incredibly hard-won, 
and is just a further manifestation of nihilism. Finally, if Nietzsche’s practical 
philosophy offends our moral sensibilities then we may have grounds for rejecting it, 
but such offence is no reason to discard an interpretation of that philosophy. 
Moving on, May suggests that affirming ER is not simply “an affective-cognitive 
state” such as a joyful craving, but that “it demands more action” (May, 2009: p.104). 
This action is a kind of promising and takes its lead from the SI passage examined 
earlier. May claims that “the capacity to promise oneself in the fullest sense - in other 
words in respect of one’s own sovereignly legislated values, those values that our 
fatedness has…built into us and whose necessity we will - is the mark of the truly 
free and sovereign individual (GM II 2)” (May, 2009: p.104). This is an admirable 
attempt to combine Sovereign Freedom with Zarathustran Freedom. Unfortunately, 
it is internally incoherent and misguided. 
May claims that “to be able to promise, to be responsible, is to live fully in time, 
to be one’s future” (May, 2009: p.104). Affirming ER amounts to promising oneself 
for the future. The idea seems to be that one promises to oneself to follow the values 
that one legislates oneself and to accept or desire that these values are provided by 
fate itself. However, we need to unpack the quote above where four things are 
equated. First, May takes the idea of promising from GM II-2. Here Nietzsche 
understands promising as the ability to stand security for some future action. The SI 
can master nature and can “uphold himself…even ‘against fate’” (GM: II-2). 
Responsibility in GM amounts to moral accountability. In order to breed an animal 
that can make promises, first those animals must consider themselves responsible for 
their actions, as doers behind deeds. ‘Living fully in time’ is rather unclear. However, 
after May’s analysis of the time-boundedness of individuals it seems to amount to 
affirming one’s existence as a product of history and fate. Furthermore, it is to accept 
the transience and flux of all things (May, 2009: p.97). ‘Being one’s future’ is also 
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unclear, but it seems to be the ability to carve one’s own life according to one’s own 
values. These four things cannot be equated. First, to be able to promise is not to be 
responsible. Rather, promising requires one to conceive of oneself as responsible. 
Responsibility is a condition for promising, not promising itself. Next, living in time 
and being one’s future, whilst not contradictory, are not the same thing. To be one’s 
future is to carve one’s own life, but to live fully in time is to accept fate and flux. To 
live fully in time one must accept that who one is might change. Whilst one can 
promise to follow one’s own values, one must accept that one’s values may change. 
This is the key problem. The ability to promise, for Nietzsche, comes from perceiving 
oneself as calculable. To promise, one’s values tomorrow must cohere with one’s 
values today. This denies transience, becoming and satisfaction with an evolving 
hierarchy. Similarly, to promise, to “uphold [oneself]…‘against fate’” is in complete 
opposition to living fully in time, which is to accept and will fate not to see oneself 
as against it. Finally, Nietzschean responsibility is decidedly not concerned with the 
moral accountability of a doer that is tied to promising in GM where May takes the 
concept from. Given this confusion, May’s introduction of promising into 
Zarathustran Freedom does little to elucidate our understanding of affirming ER. We 
can capture the full extent of the power that affirming ER has by understanding such 
affirmation as a joyful craving for ER, an affective-cognitive state. It demonstrates 
the ideal organisation of our hierarchy and gains us power over time. 
May’s use of promising here is misguided for two reasons. First, Nietzsche makes 
no mention of promising in relation to ER affirmation. He mentions the ability to will 
ER and affective states of fervent joy. We will ER only when it fills us with this kind 
of joy. May is surely aware of this in that he takes the notion of promising from GM 
II-2. Secondly, we have explored a number of reasons for rejecting this passage as 
representative of Nietzschean freedom, let alone ultimate freedom. The SI is a 
nihilistic ideal that must be overcome by Zarathustran Freedom. 
We have now seen how and why a Nietzschean self can be considered free. Such 
selves can be seen as autonomous and view themselves as autonomous. There is also 
the hope of Zarathustran Freedom. We have seen that Nietzschean autonomy and 
Zarathustran Freedom are entirely compatible with fatalism. One is autonomous 
when one’s values are an expression of one’s drives governed by one’s will to power. 
One attains Zarathustran Freedom when one affirms ER. We cannot simply choose 
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to do this, but if our DAR is ideally constituted then we can and will affirm ER. There 
is one last inconsistency to overcome. 
 
7.4 Nietzsche the Preacher 
I have argued that Nietzsche radically reconceives the concepts of selfhood, 
subjectivity, valuing and freedom within a fatalistic, drive-based framework. I have 
not argued that we should accept Nietzsche’s philosophy. One may disagree that his 
understanding of selfhood, for example, can capture subjectivity. For Nietzsche, this 
is not just philosophical disagreement, but another manifestation of a nihilistic 
conceptual system. Of course, one can philosophically reject Nietzsche’s claims. 
However, his criticisms of philosophers go deeper than philosophical debate. 
 
“The greater part of conscious thinking must still be counted among the 
instinctive activities, and this is so even in the case of philosophical 
thinking…Behind all logic too and its apparent autonomy there stand 
evaluations, in plainer terms physiological demands for the preservation 
of a certain species of life.” (BGE: 3) 
 
“I…do not believe a ‘drive to knowledge’ to be the father of philosophy, 
but that another drive has, here as elsewhere, only employed knowledge 
(and false knowledge!) as a tool. But anyone who looks at the basic drives 
of mankind to see to what extent they may in precisely this connection 
have come into play as inspirational spirits…will discover that they have 
all at some time or other practised philosophy - and that each one of them 
would only be too glad to present itself as the ultimate goal of existence.” 
(BGE: 6) 
 
“These hard, severe, abstemious, heroic spirits, who constitute the pride 
of our age, all these pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists, nihilists, 
these spiritual sceptics, ephectics, hectic ones…; these last idealists of 
knowledge, these men in whom the intellectual conscience is alone 
embodied and dwells today - they believe themselves to be as free as 
possible from the ascetic ideal, these ‘free, very free spirits’: and yet, if I 
may reveal to them what they themselves cannot see - for they are too 
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close to themselves - : this self-same ideal is their ideal too, they 
themselves are perhaps its sole representatives today.” (GM: III-24) 
 
Philosophical deliberation is no less a manifestation of one’s personal constitution 
than any other kind of deliberation and it is, for the most part, no freer from the deeply 
embedded, problematic concepts and assumptions that have their genesis in the 
ascetic ideal. It is not that we are all too stupid to ‘get Nietzsche’, it is that we are 
almost terminally unable to endorse or internalise his philosophy because of the 
conceptual system we are habituated to. This inability manifests itself in 
philosophical disagreement. From our perspective, Nietzsche’s philosophy may seem 
difficult to endorse, but Nietzsche’s point is that ‘our perspective’ is both misguided 
and extremely difficult to relinquish. 
The problem then is that reading Nietzsche’s philosophy is not necessarily going 
to bring about change. The drive to truth in philosophers, plump on metaphysics, will 
not simply abdicate. The drives to cruelty and sociality will not retire and release the 
herd member from self-punishment. These drives will make us evaluate Nietzsche 
negatively. Nietzsche is aware of this. 
 
“My time has not yet come, some are born posthumously. - One day or 
other institutions will be needed in which people live and teach as I 
understand living and teaching: perhaps even chairs for the interpretation 
of Zarathustra will be established. But it would be a complete 
contradiction of myself if I expected ears and hands for my truths already 
today: that I am not heard, that no one today knows how to take from me, 
is not only comprehensible; it even seems to me right. 
… 
Ultimately, no one can extract from things, books included, more than he 
already knows.” (EH: Books-1) 
 
“It will be some time before my writings are ‘readable’ - it is something 
for which one must be practically bovine and certainly not a ‘modern 




There are two questions here. If no one has the ability to learn more than they already 
know or to ‘logically’ accept Nietzsche’s philosophy, what is the point in that 
philosophy? Secondly, what is the point in an account of freedom that, even if 
accepted, we are not free to pursue or achieve? 
In answer to the second, we can read Nietzsche as explaining the conditions and 
possibility of freedom in a fatalistic framework. He presents the only kind of freedom 
available to us on his worldview. However, he does not suggest that this freedom can 
be attained by everyone, or even anyone. Nietzsche hopes that some individuals will 
be able to realise his freedom and, ultimately, does not think this hope is completely 
misguided. However, he thinks it will take generations before Zarathustran Freedom 
is realised. This leads to the general answer to these questions. 
Concepts effect our lives because our drives use them to express themselves in 
different ways. Nietzsche should be understood as introducing new concepts and 
redefining old concepts in order to provide the preliminary tools for reaching a new 
understanding of ourselves and the world. He is aware that these tools will not be 
accepted immediately and that, even if accepted on some level, it will take time for 
them to take hold (Gemes, 2006: p.192). Consider the concept of an ‘I’ that stands 
behind thought and action. Its history is long, rich and varied. Yet amongst all the 
disagreement over and evolutions of the concept, it has persisted. It is not just 
Nietzsche that attempts to abolish it, but it has a stranglehold over our self-conception. 
Nietzsche’s thinking is new and therefore extremely unlikely to become embedded in 
our lives immediately. Again, he is aware of this. 
 
“He who writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read, he wants 
to be learned by heart.” (TSZ: Reading and Writing) 
 
Until Zarathustra, the ascetic ideal has been the only available meaning for humanity 
(GM: III-28). Our need for meaning forces us to accept ascetic concepts. Nietzsche 
offers us an alternative, generated by new concepts. However, though this carrot now 
dangles in front of us, it will take more to accept its reality and still more to strain 





“Man is a rope, fastened between animal and Superman - a rope over an 
abyss. 
A dangerous going-across, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous 
looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and staying-still.” (TSZ: 
Prologue-4) 
 
Those that understand and accept Nietzsche are preparatory. They move humanity 
closer to superhumanity, but do not necessarily achieve superhumanity. Nietzsche 
himself is waiting for “someone ‘more pregnant with the future’, someone stronger 
than” he is to take the reins of humanity (GM: II-25). The acceptance of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is the first step on a long journey. 
 
8 - Conclusion 
Nietzsche’s theoretical and practical philosophy regarding selfhood and freedom is 
entirely consistent. Nietzsche rejects our traditional understandings of selfhood 
before reintroducing the self into his practical philosophy on his own terms. His 
notion of selfhood makes no appeal to, and does not require, the concepts that he 
theoretically rejects. We can capture subjectivity as a first-person stance that is 
achieved when one views oneself as no more than a “social structure of the drives and 
emotions” (BGE: 12). This new self exists in a fatalistic world. We are shaped entirely 
by our drives and our social and historical context. Nevertheless, Nietzsche offers us 
freedom within this world. When our selves are organised in the correct manner, we 
can consider ourselves autonomous and may achieve freedom from nihilism. We are 
free from nihilism when we joyfully crave eternal recurrence. Whilst this notion of 
freedom is unprecedented, it is the only one available to us. For Nietzsche, this is no 
conciliation prize. Nietzschean freedom is real and of significant magnitude. The 
meaning of life is down to us and the way we perceive life can gain us power over 
time itself. Rather than a contradiction, Nietzsche’s practical work is a full reckoning 
with his theoretical reflection. Overcoming potential despair, the result is a radically 
subversive philosophy. Soares asks: “Where can one think of fleeing, if the cell is 
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